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
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INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. **Plato**, the *deus philosophorum*, as Cicero calls him, was born at Athens, or possibly Aegina, in the year 428 B.C. His parentage was noble: his father's family traced its line back to Codrus, whilst on his mother's side, Plato claimed descent from Solon. It is said that his real name was Aristocles, and that it was either his fluency of speech or the breadth of his chest which won him the name of *Plato*. He was carefully educated, and was reputed a keen scholar. His life falls naturally into three divisions.

(1) *Period of Discipleship*, 428-399 B.C.—He was at first deeply impressed with the views of Heraclitus, and was drifting, it is said, into scepticism, when in his twentieth year he fell under the influence of Socrates, and, like his brothers Glaucon and Adimantus, sat at the feet of that teacher till the latter's execution in 399 B.C. There is little doubt that this act completed the disgust with which the unsettled state of politics at Athens since 415 B.C. had already inspired Plato, and contributed to turn his thoughts to the excogitation of an ideal state which should be free from the faults of the constitutions which he saw around him.


(2) *Period of Travel and Development*, 399-387 B.C.—On the death of his master he lived for some time at Megara with Euclides, a disciple of Socrates, who dwelt almost exclusively on the logical side of the Socratic teaching. In the course of his wanderings thence he reached Cyrene, and there acquired a dislike to the theory which Aristippus, the head of the *Cyrenaic* School, had wrung from the teaching of Socrates—that, as our feelings are the only thing we can be sure of, pleasure is the end of life. In Magna Graecia he found flourishing two pre-Socratic schools

of thought, both of which influenced his mind very considerably. To the *Pythagoreans* is due not only much of Plato's mysticism, but also of his fondness for mathematics. To the *Eleatics* he was indebted for the conception of the *reality*, τὸ ὄν, underlying that ceaseless *flux*, τὸ γιγνόμενον, which was, in Heraclitus's view, the only form of existence. It was under these influences that Plato conjoined to the ethical ideas he had drawn from Socrates the beginnings of a system of logic, physics and metaphysics, which he gradually blended together into an harmonious whole.

(3) *Period of Professorship at Athens, 387-347 B.C.*—During most of this time he gave free public lectures, both in the garden of his own house at Colonus, and in the Academy, a gymnasium about a mile to the north-west of the city, whence his followers took the name of the *Academic School*, or the *Academy*. These were not exactly formal lectures, but rather conversations like those in which Socrates sought to "bring men's thoughts to the birth by means of question and answer" (cf. *Phaedo*, 75 D). Probably his deeper teaching at home to his more intimate disciples, some twenty-eight in number, took more of the shape of that professorial discourse which his writings, at first pure dialogues, tended more and more to assume. Amongst this inner circle of his disciples were Speusippus, his nephew, who succeeded him as head of the *Academy*, and Aristotle, whom Plato called "the Intellect of his School," and who, after his master's death, founded the School which was called the *Peripatetic*. Plato's residence at Athens was interrupted by two visits to Sicily, which he had seemingly already once visited during the second period of his life. On the first occasion, in 387 B.C., he is said to have been at first kindly received at Syracuse by its despot, Dionysius the Elder, but to have been afterwards sold into slavery, from which he was liberated by Anniceris of Cyrene. He, however, made a great impression on Dion, the brother-in-law of the despot, who, on the death of the Elder Dionysius, in 367 B.C., invited Plato over in the hope that he would train up the despot's son and successor, the Younger Dionysius, upon the model of the philosopher-king of the *Republic*. The experiment, however, was not successful.

Dionysius grew impatient of control, banished Dion, and made it advisable that Plato should withdraw before the expiry of the year. Some years later, 361 B.C., he was induced to return, but was glad to make a hasty escape. Having thus proved to his sorrow the impracticability of his ideal state, "save in the heavens," he continued teaching at Athens till his death, 347 B.C.

§ 2. **The Writings of Plato.** There are extant, besides one book of *Letters* (almost certainly spurious), thirty-five dialogues ascribed to Plato. These have been classified in as many ways as the plays of Shakspeare. They may be arranged according to the subject-matter—ethics, physics, and metaphysics; they may be divided into dialogues of search (ζητητικοί), and of exposition (ὑφηγητικοί); or they may be arranged, not exactly in chronological order, but in order of development. The second is the orthodox and time-honoured method: the last the most fruitful. The first must needs be arbitrary, as Plato himself did not either confine or express his thought in any such definite departments—that was left for Aristotle to do, and to do well. To Plato philosophy was one and indivisible: Aristotle, while accepting its unity, broke it up, for convenience of treatment, into the still recognised parts. Aristotle handled apart both **LOGIC**, and thereafter in succession those sciences for the study of which Logic provides principles and methods. His classification of these sciences may be shown thus:—



Doubtless many of Plato's works might be assigned to one or other of these divisions; but the more important it would be very difficult to locate. The *Republic*, for instance, may be mainly political, but it treats, not merely touches, every single one of the foregoing sciences. So, too, with the *Phaedo*, the *Laws*, etc.

(1) Accepting, then, the third method of classification, we find, corresponding to the first period of Plato's life, certain *Socratic Dialogues*, in which, with a view to learning what a given thing is, various opinions concerning it are compared, the accidentals are eliminated, and ultimately, in some cases, a general concept (ἐννοια) is arrived at. It is thus that the *Laches* deals with Courage, the *Charmides* with Temperance, the first book of the *Republic* with Justice, the *Lysis* with Friendship, the *Euthyphro* with Piety, the *Protagoras* with Virtue, etc. All these are Socratic, both in subject and in method, *i.e.*, they deal with ethics, and they prove to the interlocutors, by means of question and answer (or "dialectic"), that they know neither what they are talking about, nor what they should and can know.

(2) Influenced by the various thinkers whom he met in the second period of his life, Plato went a step further by regarding these general conceptions not merely as thoughts in the mind, but as *ιδέαι*, *Ideas*, having an existence of their own. The ideas are separable (χωριστά) from things (φαινόμενα), which are, in fact, what they are, because of the ideas. He never quite explains the *how* of it: at first the ideas are present or immanent in things, and things participate in the ideas (παρουσία, μέθεξις); later the ideas are the exemplars or archetypes which things imitate (παρδείγματα, μίμησις). Only ideas can be *known*: things can only be seen, heard, felt, etc. This is because things *seem*, ideas *are*. Heraclitus is, in fact, right, so far as he goes: the phenomenal world is in a state of ceaseless flux and change (πάντα ῥεῖ), and the senses whereby we perceive it are equally unstable. But over and above this, there is an ideal world apprehended, not by the senses, but by the soul, which must be eternal, even as the ideas it comprehends. This ideal world is not continually changing (γίγνεται), but really exists (ἔστι). True, Parmenides was

wrong in thinking all that *really* exists to be one and the same ($\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{o}\nu$ *equivalent* to $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$), but he was right thus far at least: there are many realities, existences ($\acute{o}\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$), for there are many $\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\iota$; but they are all subordinate to the one supreme reality, the $\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\upsilon$. Thus *Ethics*, closely interwoven with *Politics*, finds an abiding basis in *Metaphysics* (the knowledge of what really is), and is bound up closely with *Dialectic* (the instrument whereby its truths are discovered), and with *Psychology* which deals with the nature and function of the human soul—the only home of those truths.

All this is elaborated in the second and in the early part of the third period of Plato's life in Dialogues of the middle stage of Plato's thought. Amongst these Dialogues—the precise order is fertile matter for speculation—come the *Symposium*, treating of the lofty philosophic $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\varsigma$, which impels to the pursuit of true beauty and beauteous truth; the *Meno*, which elaborates the theory that *knowledge* ($\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$, not mere $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$, *seeming*) is the reminiscence ($\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) of what the soul knew in a pre-existent state; the *Phaedo*, which asserts that the soul exists not only before birth, as is shown in the *Phaedrus*, but after death—thus, in fact, it is eternal; the *Gorgias*, which treats of pleasure, both on its ethical and on its psychological side; and the *Republic*—"that unsurpassable monument of genius," which, purporting to discover what justice is, tells us, as it were by the way, how states rise, wax and wane, works out a magnificent theory of education, and almost exhausts the analogy of state and individual.

(3) Answering to the third period of Plato's life, but in strict chronology covering only his later years, are the Dialogues from which his Syracusan experiences have taken away that high hope of the betterment of things with which he started, and in which the mysticism of Pythagoras becomes more pronounced. Of these the chief are the *Timaeus*, containing a physical theory of the universe in which the agency of the ideas is more exactly depicted than elsewhere, and the *Laws*, which retraces, in a somewhat more conservative spirit, the ground already covered in the *Republic*.

§ 3. The Early Philosophers and the Sophists.—The question which the pre-Socratic philosophers tried to answer was, What is the universal principle from which the whole of nature originated? From the days of Thales of Miletus (640-550 B.C.) the answers given to it by the thinkers of Ionia, Magna Graecia, and Sicily were of the most conflicting nature. The Ionic physicists gave various materialistic explanations of the universe; *e.g.* Thales considered that the first cause of all things was water, Heracleitus that it was fire. On the other hand, the Eleatic school in Italy, the most famous names in which are Parmenides and Zeno, regarded the only real existence as infinite, indivisible, and imperishable being apprehended by thought, and considered the phenomenal world apprehended by the senses as an illusion. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428 B.C.) made a great step in advance by asserting that Reason was the efficient cause of the universe. He maintained that each substance was composed of an infinite number of particles mainly like in nature to the whole of which they formed part (*ὁμοιομερῆ*), and that these particles, originally in a state of chaos (*δίνη*), were arranged into a *κόσμος* by *νοῦς*, an infinite and self-existent principle of Reason. Anaxagoras, who came to Athens about 460 B.C., and was an intimate friend of Pericles, shared his unpopularity, and was driven from Athens on a charge of impiety before the Peloponnesian war broke out.

The utter want of agreement among early “physicists” produced a reaction against the study of nature, and the age of the Sophists began. The name *σοφιστής*, which originally meant merely a clever man, and could be applied to a poet or legislator, was specially applied, in the fifth century B.C., to a class of popular teachers who claimed to prepare men for civic life, and to meet the want produced by the growth of the power of the people. Birth or wealth were no longer adequate to ensure the success of a public man; the power of persuading the popular Assembly was all-important, and the Sophists provided an education in rhetoric and general culture, including morals. Few of them were Athenians; and though they

centred chiefly in Athens, where there was a keen demand for the training they could give, they moved about through the various towns of Greece.

The earliest of the Sophists was Protagoras of Abdera, born about 485 B.C., and best known for his dictum, "Man is the measure of all things," *i.e.* knowledge is relative to the individual subject, and truth is different for any two individuals. Among the most famous of the later Sophists were Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. Gorgias came to Athens as an ambassador in 427 B.C., and afterwards attained fame and wealth by lecturing there on rhetoric. His attitude to the early physicists was enunciated in three propositions: (*a*) the substance for which they sought did not exist; (*b*) even if it did exist it could not be known; (*c*) if it were known, the knowledge of it could not be communicated. Prodicus, with whom Socrates himself was intimate, was well-known for his investigations into synonyms, and is still remembered for his apologue on the choice of Heracles. Hippias was famous for the wide range of his knowledge, which embraced all the existing sciences. On a far lower level stood the Eristic Sophists, who taught the art of disputation not as a means of discovering truth, but solely as a way of gaining the victory over an opponent. It is this later development which Plato specially attacks; Protagoras he regards with admiration, Gorgias with respect.

§ 4. **The Life of Socrates.**—Socrates was born in the deme of Alopece, close to Athens, about 469 B.C., his father Sophroniscus being a sculptor, and his mother Phaenarete a midwife. Of his early days little is known, but he evidently profited by the lectures and conversation of the contemporary philosophers. Unique alike in physical and intellectual qualities, he soon became a well-known character in Athens. "Short of stature, thick-necked, and somewhat corpulent, with prominent eyes, with nose upturned and nostrils outspread, with large mouth and coarse lips, he seemed the embodiment of sensuality and even stupidity."*

* "Socrates," *Encycl. Brit.*; Dr. H. Jackson.

went barefoot at all seasons of the year, wearing the same clothing both in summer and winter. He served with courage and distinction in several campaigns, being present at the siege of Potidaea (432-429 B.C.), and at the battles of Delium (424 B.C.) and of Amphipolis (422 B.C.). His upright and fearless character was strikingly shown on three important occasions. As President of the Prytanes during the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, 406 B.C., he persisted in refusing to put to the vote a motion in favour of a grossly illegal method of procedure. Again, in 404 B.C., when ordered by the Thirty Tyrants to go to Salamis to bring Leon, one of their victims, for execution, he absolutely declined to take part in the disgraceful act. Finally, in 399 B.C., he showed the same high courage when death stared him in the face.

§ 5. **The Teaching of Socrates.**—For information on this subject we are in the main dependent on three contemporaries of Socrates—Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes. The pictures given by the two former supplement one another, Plato dwelling on the more purely speculative side of Socrates' teaching, Xenophon on his influence as a moral reformer. Aristophanes, on the other hand, unfairly identifying Socrates with the ordinary Sophists, takes him as a type of the modern influences which, in the conservative view of the poet, were ruining the old institutions of Athens. In the play of the *Clouds*, acted in 423 B.C., Socrates is introduced as a pale-faced impostor, an atheist, a student of physical science, and a rhetorician who teaches how to make the worse cause appear the better. The reasons why Aristophanes took Socrates for the butt of his jests are not far to seek; his personal appearance lent itself to caricature, and he was the only teacher whose physiognomy was familiar to all Athenians. Whereas ordinary Sophists taught only pupils who paid for instruction, Socrates spent the whole day in public, conversing in the market-place and the gymnasia with persons of all ranks and ages and in the hearing of all who chose to listen.

Socrates resembled the Sophists in unsettling the conventional notions of the day, and in the belief that know-

ledge was essential to the right ordering of life. But whereas the tendency of the teaching of many of the Sophists was purely destructive, that of Socrates was also constructive. Like the Sophists, he held aloof from enquiries into the secret of the universe, partly because the contradictory results arrived at by the early physicists seemed to indicate that such enquiries were futile, and partly because he held that they were impious. He took for his subject the moral nature of man, and was in one aspect a philosopher with a reasoned theory of ethics; in another and more important aspect he was a moral reformer, performing a divine mission.

Starting with two propositions which were readily admitted—(1) Everyone really desires his own good, and (2) Virtue is the highest good—he drew the conclusion that if a man did not possess virtue, it must be because he was ignorant of what constituted virtue. Knowledge in this way became synonymous with virtue, and vice with ignorance. In order to live a good life, a man must know the nature of justice, courage, piety, and the other good qualities which were embraced under the general name of virtue. The contemporaries of Socrates were confident enough that they understood what these words meant; his first step was to show that their confidence was misplaced,—to act as physician of the soul, and to purge it from error.

The method he adopted was that of question and answer—the famous *διαλεκτική*, which had indeed been employed with success by the Eleatic Zeno, but which in Socrates' hands achieved its chief fame. Starting with some popular definition the truth of which his interlocutor readily admitted, he would lead him, by his skilful questioning, to deduce from it consequences which were manifestly inconsistent with known facts, and thus disprove the proposition with which he started.

Such was the Socratic *ἐλεγχος* ("cross-examination"), which reduced the interlocutor to a state of perplexity, in which often he was content to remain, without trying to make any further advance. During the whole process, Socrates pretended to be entirely ignorant, and to be

trying to gain from others the knowledge that was wanting in himself. The mortification which men felt at the exposure of their ignorance undoubtedly made Socrates many enemies; and the unsettlement of conventional opinions scandalised the orthodox.

Having thus cleared away the chief obstacle from the path to knowledge, Socrates now applied his positive or constructive method. To those of his hearers who did not leave him through personal pique he put suggestive questions tending to draw out what was in them, and thus associated them with himself in the search for knowledge. This process of educating men's latent thoughts he metaphorically designated as *μαίευτική*, "bringing to the birth." In this way it was possible to arrive at true conceptions of justice, temperance, etc., by which a man would be able to regulate his conduct, aiming at good objects and avoiding bad. Since the definitions were arrived at by comparing specific instances, *e.g.* of justice, and ascertaining what was the element common to all, Aristotle can say that Socrates rendered two great services to philosophy, by introducing induction and definition.

Such was the philosophical method of Socrates; but his chief importance lies in the example of his life, his passion for goodness, and his personal influence over men. For him to know the right was to do the right: he was apparently unconscious of the power which the desires and the will of the ordinary man have to fight against his reason,—a fact which explains the one-sidedness of his ethical theory. Nor did he realise the possibility of a conflict between duty and expediency: both were contained in his notion of "the good": what is right, he held, is always of the highest advantage to the soul.

§ 6. **The Trial and Death of Socrates.**—It is not surprising that in the Athens of that time Socrates' methods and opinions should have procured for him many bitter enemies; the only fact that is surprising is that he was allowed to practise them so long. In 399 B.C., however, four years after the restoration of the democracy, he was indicted on a charge of impiety. There can be no doubt that he was selected as a victim because of his known

dislike for popular government (he believed in an aristocracy of the wise and good), and his association in earlier days with Critias, the most hated of the Thirty Tyrants. The prosecutors were three in number, Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon. The first of these, although technically the leading prosecutor, is known only as a poet; the third was a rhetorician; and both represented the hatred felt for Socrates by the classes to which they respectively belonged. Anytus, the most important of the three, was a wealthy tanner, who had suffered heavily at the hands of the Thirty Tyrants and had taken a prominent part in the restoration of the democracy. He was animated not only by hatred of the friends of Critias, but perhaps also by a personal grudge, for his own son had become attached to Socrates and imbibed his ideas.

Socrates was tried in the ordinary Athenian court (*δικαστήριον*) and found guilty. According to the usual custom, after the verdict the accuser and the prisoner were invited each to suggest a penalty, to aid the court in determining the sentence. The prosecution suggested death, and, in view of the serious nature of the conviction, it was expected that Socrates would propose exile. He did not, however; and, if we may trust Plato, gave his reasons. If he left Athens, life would be impossible for him. He had lived seventy years in his native city, and if his fellow-citizens could not tolerate him, it was not to be expected strangers would. He could not give up the teaching which he considered to be his mission. He therefore first suggested that he should be maintained in the Prytaneum (town hall) at the public expense; but at the instance of his friends so far gave way as to propose instead a fine of thirty minae, quite an insignificant sum. The result was that the court accepted the assessment of the penalty made by the prosecution, and Socrates was condemned to death.

The execution of the sentence was delayed for ceremonial reasons. The *Salaminia*, one of the state galleys, had started on its annual voyage to Delos for the festival of Apollo; and it was considered impious to put any one to death until it had returned. Socrates remained in prison

for thirty days, during which his friends had free access to him. He refused to make any attempt at escape, and died serenely when the appointed time came.

Four of Plato's dialogues—the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*—deal with the trial and death of Socrates. Of these the *Euthyphro* serves as an introduction to the other three. In that dialogue Socrates, by his favourite method of cross-examination, demonstrates to Euthyphro, the representative of average Athenian opinion, that he does not know what impiety means.

In the *Apology* Socrates defends himself in court, and answers the charges of his accusers, which were: (1) Socrates corrupts the young, (2) he does not believe in the gods of the state, (3) he believes in other new deities. The first two charges Socrates takes together, demonstrating that he had never attempted to corrupt the young by irreligious teaching. The third count in the indictment was based upon Socrates' assertion that he had had from childhood intimations given to him by a divine voice. This assertion he still maintains in his defence, but adds that he never at any time represented the "voice" as a separate divinity.

In the *Crito* the question whether Socrates would be right in escaping from his prison is discussed.

The *Phaedo* consists of a conversation between Socrates and his friends upon the immortality of the soul, to which is added the description of Socrates' death.

§ 7. **The Crito.** Plato felt that the *Apology* alone was not a full vindication of the character of Socrates. The speech proves that he was a good man, but it remains to be shown that he was a good citizen. To establish his innocence it was necessary to prove the verdict unjust: his patriotism could only be made clear by showing that, although he knew that the verdict was unjust, Socrates never questioned the rights of the state over the individual, but loyally accepted death because the verdict was, at least formally, the verdict of his country.

The question of the escape from the prison is admirably suited to Plato's purpose. If it is assumed that Socrates could easily have escaped and would not, then his death

was a voluntary sacrifice, the greatest sacrifice that his country could demand or his patriotism make.

It is characteristic of Plato's artistic skill that his defence of Socrates appears to grow gradually out of a commonplace discussion. In the first section of the dialogue Crito is the chief speaker, and urges Socrates to fly, asking him to consider his duty to his family and to his friends, whom the world would accuse of backwardness in saving him, and pleading that, as the decision of the court was not right, Socrates will be doing wrong in allowing it to take effect. In the middle section Socrates refutes Crito's arguments, and in doing so establishes the principles that wrong must not be repaid with wrong, and that just contracts must be fulfilled. Finally, in an imaginary dialogue carried on between himself and the Laws of Athens, he shows that least of all in the relation between the individual and the state should wrong be repaid with wrong, and that between himself and Athens there is a peculiarly binding contract. The conclusion therefore is that he must stay and die.

The date of the *Crito* is not known, but it is so closely connected with the *Apology* that it is natural to assume that both were composed about the same time. They belong in style to the earlier period of Plato's life, and it may be supposed that they were written not long after Socrates' death.

NOTE.

THE Text, except in a few places, follows that of Wohlrab in the Teubner Series. In the preparation of the Notes the commentaries of Göbel, Schmelzer, Stallbaum-Wohlrab, and Mr. Adam have been consulted. For the first two sections of the Introduction the Editor is indebted to the "University Tutorial Series" edition of the *Phaedo*, and for §§ 3, 4, 5, and a part of § 6, to Mr. T. R. Mills' edition of the *Apology* in the same series.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

St. I.

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43

A I. ΣΩ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῶ 1
ἔτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

ΚΡ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς.

5

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου
φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ
πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι;

10

ΚΡ. Ἐπεικῶς πάλαι.

B ΣΩ. Εἴτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθύς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ
παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς
ἠθέλον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ 15
καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὥς ἠδέως καθεύ-
δεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὥς ἠδιστα διάγῃς.

CRIT.

C

1 καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ 43
 εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺν δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ
 20 παρεστῶσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾶως
 φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἶη ἀγα-
 νακτεῖν τηλικούτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν. C

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύ-
 25 ταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπι-
 λύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ
 τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῶ ἀφίξαι ;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπὴν οὐ
 30 σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις
 πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ,
ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην ; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Δήλου,
 οὗ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με ; D

35 ΚΡ. Οὐ τοι δὴ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν
 τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἤκουτές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου
 καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν
 ἀγγελιῶν, ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον
 ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

2 II. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτη
 τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν
 αὐτὸ τήμερον. 44

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει ;

5 ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δεῖ με
 ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ
 ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἕκ τινος ἐνυπνίου,

44 ὁ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κιν- 2
δυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με. 11

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον ;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ
B εὐειδὴς λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν·
ὦ Σώκρατες, 15

ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

III. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὥς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαίμόνιε 3
Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι· ὥς ἐμοί,
ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν
τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ
ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ 5
C σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὥς οἷός τ' ὦν σε σφάζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀνα-
λίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη
ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι
ἢ φίλους ; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὥς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ
ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων. 10

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς
τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει ; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν
μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πε-
πρᾶχθαι, ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ.

D ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δὴ, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ 15
τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα
νυνί, ὅτι οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν
κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εἴαν τις
ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὠφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τ' εἶναι οἱ 20
πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τ' ᾗσαν
καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν. νῦν δὲ

3 οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα 44
 δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι.

4 IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Ε
 Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι· ἄρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεὶ καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ
 συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὥς σὲ ἐνθένδε
 5 ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν
 ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις
 παθεῖν ; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβῇ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· 45
 ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοι ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν
 τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καί, ἐὰν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω.

10 ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα
 πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ
 τὰργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ
 15 ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκο-
 φάντας ὥς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολ-
 λοῦ ἀργυρίου ; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, Β
 ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ
 οἶει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι ἔτι ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀνα-
 20 λίσκειν. εἷς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον
 ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ
 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα
 φοβούμενος ἀποκάμῃς σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε, ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν
 τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις
 25 ἐξελθὼν ὅτι χρῶο σαυτῷ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε
 ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θεττα- Γ
 λίαν ἵεναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ
 ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥστε σε
 μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

45 V. Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς 5
 ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· καὶ
 τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ
 ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσάν σε διαφθεῖραι
 βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ 5
 D ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ
 ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅτι
 ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δέ, ὥς τὸ εἶκός,
 τοιούτων, οἷάπερ εἶωθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις
 περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας 10
 ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδέοντα· σὺ
 δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ
 ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι,
 φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖ-
 E σθαι· ὥς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν 15
 ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ
 σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος
 τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὥς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελ-
 θεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης, ὥς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ
 τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, 20
 46 κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγένοι ἡμᾶς
 δοκεῖν, οἷτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν, οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν οἶόν τε
 ὄν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτα
 οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὄρα, μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχυρᾷ ἢ
 σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βου- 25
 λεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή·
 τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι.
 εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶόν τε.
 ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδα-
 μῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

30

VI. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ 6

ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσω μείζων, 46
 τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε
 ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή. ὥς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ
 ε καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι
 ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται.
 τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι
 νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἤδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχε-
 δόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω
 10 καὶ τιμῶ, οὗσπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὦν ἂν μὴ βελτίῳ ἔχωμεν
 λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοὶ ξυγχωρήσω,
 οὐδ' ἂν πλείῳ τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις
 ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται δεσμούς καὶ θανά-
 τους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν
 15 ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποῖμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον
 τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν,
 πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ
 τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ D
 δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατὰδηλος ἄρα
 20 ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἐνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ
 καὶ φλυαρία ὥς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἐγὼ ἐπισκέψ-
 ασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιό-
 τερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν
 χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ.
 25 ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν
 οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν
 δοξῶν, ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ
 πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ E
 Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοὶ λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε
 30 τὰνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον,
 καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούοι ἢ παροῦσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει
 δὴ· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοὶ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ 47

47 τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δ' οὐ, 6
οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δ' οὐ ; τί φῆς ; ταῦτα
οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται ; 35

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μέν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς
μή ;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρηστὰι δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ 40
αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων ;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ;

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο ; 7
B γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς
ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει,
ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδο-
τρίβης ὢν ; 5

ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπά-
ζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ
τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δῆ. 10

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ
ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ
καὶ ἐπαῖοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

C ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ 15
τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν
πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαῖόντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν
πείσεται ;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο ; καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ 20
εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος ;

7 ΚΡ. Δῆλον, ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν. 47

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διῶμεν; καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν
25 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν
καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, πότερον
τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι D
αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαῖων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ
αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας
30 τοὺς ἄλλους; ὧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν διαφθερούμεν
ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον
ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι
τοῦτο;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

8 VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, εἰὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν
βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρό-
μενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων
δόξῃ, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; E
5 ἐστὶ δέ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ
διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

10 ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθα-
ρμένου, ὧ τὸ ἀδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν;
ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι
ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἢ 48
δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

15 ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φρον-

48 τιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ ἐπαίτων 8
 περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. 20
 ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ εἰσηγούμενος
 τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν
 δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ
 μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ
 B ἀποκτινύναι.

25

KP. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ
 λόγος, ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι
 καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν
 ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ 30
 εὖ ζῆν.

KP. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν
 ἐστίν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

KP. Μένει.

35

IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο 9
 σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι
 C ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν
 μὲν φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐώμεν. ἂς
 δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων 5
 καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ
 Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ
 ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ
 τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως
 αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἡ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέ- 10
 γομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες
 D τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ
 αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδι-
 κήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· καὶ φαινώμεθα ἄδικα

9 αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐδέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ 48
 16 ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας,
 οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

KP. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅρα
 δέ, τί δρῶμεν.

20 ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πη ἔχεις
 ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι·
 εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων E
 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὥς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων
 ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὥς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσαι σε
 25 ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκουτος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς
 σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴαν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἷη. 49

KP. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

10 X. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον
 εἶναι ἢ τινι μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ
 οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὥς
 πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη;
 5 ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖςδε
 ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσὶν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ
 Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοῖδε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους
 σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων B
 οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει,
 10 ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή,
 καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε
 καὶ πρατότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κα-
 κὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν
 ἢ οὐ;

15 KP. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

KP. Οὐ δῆτα.

49 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ 10
 C οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

KP. Οὐ φαίνεται. 20

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

KP. Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὥς οἱ
 πολλοί φασιν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς. 25

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδι-
 κεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

KP. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν
 οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν. 30
 καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ
 D δόξαν ὁμολογῆς, οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ
 δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή,
 τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους
 ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευ- 35
 ματα. σκόπει δὲ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινω-
 νεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι· καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευό-
 μενοι, ὥς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε
 τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι
 ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς 40
 E ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι
 δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε.
 εἰ δ' ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

KP. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὲ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· 45
 πότερον ἢ ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον
 ἢ ἐξαπατητέον; (τίνι)

KP. Ποιητέον.

11 XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε 49
 ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποι- 50
 οῦμεν καὶ ταῦτα οὐς ἤκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν
 οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὐ ;

5 ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ
 ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε
 εἶτε ἀποδιδράσκειν εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο,
 ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες
 10 ἔροιντο· εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ποιεῖν ;
 ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ὃ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε
 νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν
 μέρος ; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι B
 καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν
 15 ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνονται καὶ
 διαφθείρονται ; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ
 ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι ἄλλως τε καὶ
 ῥήτωρ εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς
 τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ
 20 ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι ἡδίκηκε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ C
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε ; ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν ;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

12 XII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ
 ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ ; εἰ οὖν
 αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν, ὅτι ὦ
 5 Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου,
 ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾷν τε καὶ ἀποκρί-
 νεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει
 ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι ; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεν- D
 νήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου

50 ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε ; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν 12
 τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὥς οὐ 11
 καλῶς ἔχουσιν ; ‘ οὐ μέμφομαι,’ φαίην ἄν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς
 περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ᾗ
 καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης ; ἥ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ
 ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ 15
 τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν ;
 ‘ καλῶς,’ φαίην ἄν.

Ε εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαι-
 δεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μέν, ὥς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος
 ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ 20
 πρόγονοι ; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, ἂρ’ ἐξ ἴσου οἶει
 εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττ’ ἂν ἡμεῖς σε
 ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶει
 δίκαιον εἶναι ; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ
 ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἰ σοὶ ὦν 25
 ἐτύγχανε, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν,
 51 οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντι-
 τύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα
 ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε, εἴαν σε ἐπιχειρῶ-
 μεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ 30
 ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, καθ’ ὅσον δύνασαι,
 ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν
 δίκαια πράττειν ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελό-
 μενος ;

ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε, ὅτι μητρός τε 35
 καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώ-
 τερόν ἐστιν ἢ πατὴρ καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ
 Β ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώποις
 τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπεί-
 κειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, 40

12 καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν, ἃ ἂν κελεύη, καὶ πάσχειν, 51
 εἴαν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, εἴαν τε
 τύπτεσθαι εἴαν τε δεῖσθαι, εἴαν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ
 τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ
 45 τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀνα-
 χωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ
 καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον, ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ
 ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτήν, ἢ τὸ δίκαιον
 πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε
 50 πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἡττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί
 φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς
 νόμους ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

13 XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν
 ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ
 δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν, ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς
 γάρ σε γεννήσαντες ἐκθρέψαντες παιδεύσαντες μετα-
 5 δόντες ἀπάντων ὧν οἰοί τ' ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξου-
 σίαν πεποιηκέσαι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν
 δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς
 τοὺς νόμους, ὧς ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα
 10 τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν
 τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστίν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εἴαν τέ τις
 βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν
 ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εἴαν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποί ἐλθῶν,
 ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε, ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὃς δ'
 15 ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας
 δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἥδη φαρὲν
 τοῦτον ὠμολογηκέσαι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν
 ποιήσῃ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαρμεν

51 ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ 13
 ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε 20
 52 πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιούμεν,
 προτιθέντων ἡμῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταπτόντων ποιεῖν
 ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἣ πείθειν
 ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύταις δὴ φάμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς 14
 αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ
 ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ
 εἴποιμι, διὰ τί δή; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο
 λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς 5
 ὁμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαῖεν γὰρ
 B ἂν, ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλη ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν,
 ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν
 αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἡρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτ' 10
 ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες [, ὅτι μὴ
 ἀπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν,] οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρα-
 τευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε,
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης
 πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς 15
 C σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα
 ἡμᾶς ἡροῦ, καὶ ὁμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι,
τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὥς ἀρεσκούσης
 σοι τῆς πόλεως.

ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσα- 20
 σθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως
 ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν
 ἐκαλλωπίζου ὥς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε,
 ἀλλὰ ἡροῦ, ὥς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ
 οὔτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν 25

14 νόμων ἐντρέπει ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ D
 ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχει-
 ρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς
 ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν
 30 τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῇ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε
 ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ
 λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῇ. τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων ;
 ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν ;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

35 ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαῖεν ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ E
 ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ
 χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν
 ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν
 40 ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογαί εἶναι.
 σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ
 ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν
 Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω 53
 ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χῶλοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ
 45 ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων
 Ἀθηναίων ἡρεσκεν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον
 ὅτι· τίνοι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων ; νῦν δὲ δὴ
 οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις ; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ,
 ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς
 50 πόλεως ἐξελθών.

15 XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρ-
 τάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπι-
 τηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσί γέ B
 σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς
 5 πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς
 δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς,

53 ἡ Θήβαζε ἡ Μέγαράδε — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεραι —, 15
 πολέμιος ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ
 ὅσοιπερ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονται σε
 διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς 10
 δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην
 C δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς ἐστίν, σφόδρα
 που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων δια-
 φθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας
 πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο 15
 ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἐσται; ἡ πλησιάσεις
 τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος — τίνας λό-
 γους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἡ οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ
 δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ
 νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖ- 20
 D σθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἷεσθαί γε χρή.

ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς
 Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ
 δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως
 σου ἀκούοιεν, ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρα- 25
 σκες σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθέμενος ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ
 ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδρά-
 σκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ
 γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς
 E τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν νόμους 30
 τοὺς μέγιστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή
 τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ
 ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ, ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώ-
 πους καὶ δουλεύων — τί ποιῶν; ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετ-
 ταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; 35
 λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
 54 ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἐσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα

15 βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς ; τί δέ ; 54
 εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψῃς τε καὶ παιδεύσεις
 40 ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν ; ἢ τοῦτο
 μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζώντος βέλτιον θρέψου-
 ται καὶ παιδεύσονται μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς ; οἱ γὰρ
 ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἂν εἰς
 Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἂν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδου
 45 ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται ; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος
 αὐτῶν ἔστιν τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, B
 οἷεσθαί γε χρή.

16 XVI. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς
 τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν
 μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου ἐλθὼν
 ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν·
 5 οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον
 εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν
 σῶν οὐδενὶ οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ
 νῦν μὲν ἡδίκημένος ἄπει, ἂν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν
 νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἂν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως C
 10 αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυ-
 τοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς
 καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἤκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν
 τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλε-
 πανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν
 15 Ἄιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται εἰδότες, ὅτι
 καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ
 μή σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς. D

17 XVII. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι
 ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν
 δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἢ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν
 λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων

54 ἀκούειν. ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν 17
λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἶει 6
πλέον ποιήσῃ, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε ΣΩ. Ἐὰ τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, 10
ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

NOTES.

The references are to the chapters and lines of the text:

Cp. = compare. Sc. (*Scilicet*) = supply.

κ.τ.λ. = καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ = *et cetera*.

An obelus (†) prefixed to a note indicates that the text is doubtful.

Ch. 1-2.—*Socrates waking finds Crito in his cell, and asks him why he has come so early; to which Crito replies that he has received news that the sacred ship, whose coming from Delos is to be the signal for Socrates' death, has arrived at Sunium. Socrates then relates a dream, which seems to show that he will not die till two days later.*

1. 1. **τηνικάδε**: “at this hour,” that is “so early.” **Κρίτων**: a friend and disciple of Socrates. He was an Athenian citizen, and possessed wealth which was always at his master's service.

4. **πηνίκα μάλιστα**: “about what time is it?” **μάλιστα**, like the Latin *maxime*, is added to expressions of number, quantity, etc., to indicate that they are not exact.

5. **ὄρθρος βαθύς**: *ὄρθρος* is “twilight,” and *βαθύς* implies that it was nearer night than morning; so the whole phrase means “dim twilight,” and may be rendered “just before daybreak.”

6. **θαυμάζω, ὅπως**: “I wonder how it was that . . .” θαυμάζω εἰ means “I wonder that.”

7. **ὑπακοῦσαι**: this word is used technically for “answering a door.”

11. **ἐπεικῶς**: “fairly.”

14. **οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί, ὦ Σώκρατες, κ.τ.λ.**: the general sense of the passage is “I know to my cost what sorrow and sleeplessness mean, and I saw how peacefully you were sleeping, so I purposely did not wake you.” Crito, who is excited, inverts the order of thought, stating the reasons for his actions first, and the action itself afterwards. Both *οὐ* and *οὐδέ* negative *ἤθελον*. Some editors place a

colon after Σώκρατες, and consider the words, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ὦ Σώκρατες, to be a negative answer to Socrates' previous question; render "I would not (*sc.* wake you), Socrates; it is not by my own choice . . . etc."

15. τοσαύτη τε ἀγρυπνία καὶ λύπη: τοσαύτη must be supplied with λύπη, in which case the τε is in its proper place. Otherwise τε would be put after ἀγρυπνία. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω: θαυμάζω is used with the accusative of the thing which excites wonder, and the genitive of the person possessing it. To express actions begun in the past, and still going on in the present, English uses the continuous present-perfect, *e.g.* "I have been wondering," Greek and most other European languages the present.

17. οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα . . . διάγῃς: here the subjunctive present replaces the optative of the ordinary sequence, because Crito wishes to reproduce graphically his thought—"I will refrain from waking Socrates, that he may pass his time. . . ." ἡδιστα: that sound and dreamless sleep was the most perfect happiness was the opinion of Socrates himself. So also Sophocles speaks of the unconsciousness of childhood as the "sweetest life."

19. εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου: the genitive is causal.

20. ὥς ῥαδίως: ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως.

23. τηλικούτον ὄντα: "at my time of life." Socrates was seventy years of age.

25. οὐδὲν . . . ἀγανακτεῖν: ἐπιλύεται here is equivalent to a verb of preventing; such verbs when positive are followed by μὴ with the infinitive, when negative by μὴ οὐ with the infinitive; the article may or may not be inserted.

32. ἐν τοῖς βαρύντατα: the phrase ἐν τοῖς is used to strengthen superlative adverbs and adjectives. In the case of adverbs a participle in the dative plural must be supplied from the verb which the adverb modifies, *e.g.* here ἐν τοῖς βαρέως φέρουσι βαρύντατα φέρω, "among those who are distressed, I am the most distressed."

33. ταύτην: *sc.* ἀγγελίαν φέρεις. ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται: ἢ (Latin *an*) is used in the second limb of a double question. Here the second question ἢ . . . με restricts and corrects the first τίνα ταύτην; τὸ πλοῖον is the ship sent yearly on a sacred mission from Athens to Delos. It was currently believed that when Theseus killed the Minotaur, and saved Athens from having to send seven youths and seven maidens yearly to Crete to be devoured, he vowed to dispatch a sacred embassy (θεωρία) yearly to the temple of Apollo in Delos. This custom continued, and every year during the θεωρία the city

was kept pure, no criminals being executed. The time of purification began when the priest of Apollo crowned with garlands the stern of the ship which was to convey the embassy, and ended with its return. The ship had left Athens the day before Socrates' trial.

35. οὐ τοι δὴ ἀφίκεται : "it has not actually come."

36. Σουνίου : the promontory of Sunium was the extreme S.E. point of Attica.

38. †τῶν ἀγγελιῶν : most MSS. read ἀγγέλων, "messengers," which the sense does not require. Some editors omit the words, leaving ἐκ τούτων, "from them," i.e., the persons referred to above, τινες. Here ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγελιῶν must mean "from what they say."

2. 1. τύχη ἀγαθῇ : sc. γένοιτο, "may it turn out well!" The words refer to τὸν βίον τελευτᾶν. Like the Latin *quod bene vertat*, the phrase was frequently used to create a good omen at the beginning of an undertaking, e.g. the opening of a campaign or the signing of a truce.

7. οἱ τούτων κύριοι : "those who have the power to decide these matters," i.e. the Eleven, a board who had charge of prisons, and, like our sheriffs, superintended executions.

8. τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας : genitive of time within which ; Socrates is referring to the day which has just begun.

10. κινδυνεύεις . . . με : ἐν καιρῷ τι, lit. "at somewhat the right time." The sense of the passage is, "and perhaps it was fortunate that you did not wake me."

16. ἡματι . . . ἰκοῖο : an adaptation of *Iliad*, IX., 363, ἡματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοίμην, "on the third day I shall reach fertile Phthia." ἡματι is an epic form for ἡμέρα. ἂν ἰκοιο, the potential future statement, is often to be translated, not by the English conditional, but by the future. In Homer Achilles is speaking of his return to his home Phthia in Thessaly, which was three days' sail from Troy. In Socrates' mind the name connects itself with φθίνω (cp. English phthisis), "I waste away, die." οἱ φθιμένοι in poetry means "the dead."

18. ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν : in dialogue μὲν οὖν is used to correct. Here Socrates' ἐναργές, "clear," corrects Crito's ἀπορον, "absurd." Socrates believed in dreams and divination ; and, as this dialogue is a vindication of Socrates' character from the charge of disbelieving in the popular religion, Plato emphasises the point, though he himself did not believe in dreams.

Ch. 3.—*Crito once more begs Socrates to escape from the prison, if for no other reason than to save the reputation of his friends, whom the world will regard as having been too selfish to contrive his escape. Socrates replies that the opinion of the world is not worth considering.*

3. 1. **λίαν γε** : *sc. ἐναργές*. **δαιμόνιε** : this word, which originally meant “superhuman,” was used in conversation at Athens when a person was addressed in a tone of playful remonstrance. **μακάριος**, “blessed,” and **θαυμάσιος**, “admirable,” were similarly used. The only equivalents in English are “dear,” “good,” “excellent.”

2. **ἔτι καὶ νῦν** : “even now.” It is implied that Crito had before attempted to persuade Socrates to escape.

3. **ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς . . . ἔστιν . . . ἔστερήσθαι** : Crito speaks as if the disaster had already come, and as if he had already lost his friend ; therefore in the conditional sentence the present **ἔστιν**, not the future **ἔσται**, is used, and later in the sentence the perfect **ἔστερήσθαι** replaces the aorist **στερηθῆναι**. **χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἔστερήσθαι . . . ἔτι δὲ δόξω** : normally **μὲν** and **δέ** are only used to contrast coordinate expressions, not as here to contrast a subordinate phrase and the principal sentence. Dialogue, which is intended to resemble conversation, is always liable to produce exceptions to the rules formulated by grammarians.

4. **οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω** : **οὐ μὴ** with the aorist subjunctive, and sometimes, as here, with the future indicative, has the force of an emphatic future with **οὐ**. The aorist subjunctive is on the whole the commoner of the two constructions. When **οὐ μὴ** is used with the second person singular of the future indicative, the emphatic negative statement is (as it would be in English) virtually equivalent to a command ; *e.g.* **οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις**, “you shall not talk nonsense.”

5. **οἷ . . . μὴ . . . ἴσασιν** : the relative clause implies a condition ; therefore **μὴ**, not **οὐ**, is used. Only if people did not know Socrates and Crito, could they suppose that Socrates’ failure to escape was due to the backwardness of his friends.

9. **οἱ πολλοί** : this phrase may be represented by such words as “the world,” “people,” or, when used contemptuously, by “the multitude,” “the people,” “the many.” It had special significance in a state like Athens, which was governed by the majority.

16. **αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἱοί τ’ εἰσὶν . . .** : usually the personal construction with **δῆλος** only occurs when the subject of the following verb or participle is the noun in agreement with

δηλός, e.g. δηλός ἐστι τοῦτο ποιῶν, or δηλός ἐστι ὅτι τοῦτο ποιεῖ, "he is clearly doing this." Here the usage is extended to a case where the subject is not the same, and where the impersonal construction, δηλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ., would have been used in more formal prose.

20. εἰ γὰρ ὥφελον . . . ἐργάζεσθαι : this is the usual construction for expressing a wish that things had been otherwise than they are. The Latin equivalent would be the imperfect subjunctive.

21. ἵνα οἱοί τ' ἦσαν : in Attic Greek a past tense of the indicative is used after ἵνα in a final clause when it is implied that the purpose was not fulfilled because its realisation depended on an unfulfilled condition. In this case the purpose is "that they might have been able to do the greatest good," and depends on the unfulfilled condition, their being able to do the greatest harm.

22. καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν : an independent predication coordinate with the wish, εἰ γὰρ ὥφελον . . . ἐργάζεσθαι.

23. φρόνιμον : τὸ φρόνιμον, which included virtue and knowledge, was, according to Socrates, the chief end of life (*summum bonum*). The multitude being without knowledge could not attain it, but might do anything to anybody.

Ch. 4.—*Crito begs Socrates not to let the fear of any danger to his friends, or anything that he said at his trial about the unhappiness of exile, prevent him from escaping.*

4. 2. ἄρά γε μή : ἄρα μή (Latin *num*) introduces a question expecting a negative answer. προμηθεῖ . . . μή : the construction is that of a verb of fearing.

3. οἱ συκοφάνται : professional informers, who did the work of detectives, were the curse of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

4. ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχουσιν . . . καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν : "cause us annoyance and we be compelled." The present is used of a continued process, whereas ἀναγκασθῶμεν is used of a single event.

5. ἢ καὶ . . . ἢ . . . ἢ καὶ : the more terrible alternatives are marked by καί. Translate, "either . . . or at least . . . or perhaps . . ."

6. ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις : i.e. exile ; cp. l. 19.

7. ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν : "dismiss it from your mind," lit. "let it enjoy itself," sc. without your caring.

8. δίκαιοι ἐσμεν . . . κινδυνεύειν : certain adjectives, of which δίκαιος is one, may be used personally with the infinitive. In

English the impersonal construction with the infinitive as subject alone is possible ; *e.g.* "it is right that we should take the risk."

10. *μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ* : "do not say no."

15. *ἔπειτα . . . εὐτελεῖς* : *τούτους*, "these," is used to express contempt. *ὥς εὐτελεῖς* (*sc. εἰσι*), an exclamation dependent on *ὀργῆς*. In English *τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας* would be the subject of the dependent clause ; render, "then you must see how cheap these informers are."

16. *ἐπ' αὐτούς* : "for them."

19. *ξένοι . . . ἀναλίσκειν* : *ξένοι*, *i.e.* men who were not citizens of Athens, would not like Crito to be exposed to the risk of being exiled. *ἐνθάδε* : Crito speaks of them as if they were actually present.

21. *Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος . . . καὶ Κέβης* : Simmias and Cebes were pupils of the philosopher Philolaus, but subsequently joined Socrates. They were present at his death, and took part in the dialogue called the *Phaedo*.

22. *ὅπερ λέγω* : in referring to a previous assertion in the same discussion Greek employs the present. *μήτε . . . ἀποκάμης* : "do not shrink from." Elsewhere the word is used absolutely in the sense of "yielding to weariness," this being the only case where it is followed by an infinitive.

23. *μήτε . . . γενέσθω* : in a prohibition referring to a single act the aorist subjunctive is commonly used. The aorist imperative occurs sometimes in the third person, but never in the second. *ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ* : see *Introd.*, p. 13.

25. *πολλαχοῦ . . . καὶ ἄλλοσε . . . σε* : *ἀγαπήσουσι* requires *ἄλλοθι*, for people would love Socrates elsewhere, not elsewhither ; but the word has been assimilated to the following *ὅποι*.

Ch. 5.—*Crito urges that if Socrates' enemies were wrong in attempting to contrive his death, he is wrong in refusing to escape. He owes it to his family and to his friends to make the attempt, and it must be made at once.*

5. 2. *ἔξὸν σωθῆναι* : "when you might have escaped," accusative absolute.

5. *υἱεῖς* : Socrates had three sons, of whom the eldest, Lamprocles, was still a youth at the time of his father's death. The other two were children:

6. *ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι* : "to finish their nurture and education," which had been already begun.

7. τὸ σὸν μέρος : “as far as you are concerned,” adverbial accusative. ὅτι ἂν . . . πράξουσιν : lit. “they will do whatever they happen to do”; that is, “they will have to take their chance.”

10. τοῦ χρή : “it is not right.” Some editors read the imperfect χρῆν, “it was not right.” With the first reading the remark is general, with the second it is particular and refers to Socrates only.

14. φάσκοντά γε δῆ : “more especially as you say . . .” The participle has a causal sense, and is used ironically.

17. αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξη : αἰσχύνομαι has the construction of a verb of fearing.

18. καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος . . . καὶ . . . ὁ ἀγὼν . . . καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον τουτί : these words are an expansion of ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα above. The trial is spoken of in language that suggests a tragedy, εἴσοδος being a technical word for the first scene, and ἀγὼν being frequently used of a dramatic contest.

19. τὼς εἰσῆλθεν . . . εἰσελθεῖν : with this reading the subject of εἰσῆλθεν must be δίκη, and the meaning that the suit need not have been brought into court. Some editors read εἰσῆλθες, in which case the subject is Socrates, and Crito would seem to suggest that Socrates could have left Athens between the time that notice of the prosecution was given and the actual trial.

20. καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον . . . δοκεῖν : the words from κακία . . . δοκεῖν explain τὸ τελευταῖον τουτί, and so ultimately (see above) ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα. Thus δοκεῖν is part of the subject of δόξη.

21. κατὰγελως τῆς πράξεως : the genitive is objective, the sense being “this last scene, which makes the whole performance a farce.”

23. οὔτινες . . . ἐσώσαμεν : the clause is the equivalent of a Latin causal relative. οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν . . . : the construction here passes from a relative clause to a principal sentence, a looseness of grammar natural in conversation. The whole grammatical structure of the sentence from ὡς ἔγωγε . . . ὄφελος ἦν should be carefully studied by means of analysis.

25. ἅμα τῷ κακῷ : ἅμα τῷ κακῷ εἶναι.

27. βεβουλευσθαι : “to have decided,” i.e. to be in a state of mind which is the present result of past deliberation.

Ch. 6-7.—Socrates answers Crito by recurring to the question of the value of opinions. He points out that previously in discussions they have always assumed that the opinion of the expert is more

valuable than that of the multitude. An athlete who is training, if he disregards the opinion of his trainer, injures his body; and so in morals a man who disregards the opinion of the one man who understands, and follows the opinion of the many who do not, injures his soul.

6. 1. ἡ προθυμία . . . εἷη : ἐστὶ is to be supplied with ἀξία. The irregularity in the conditional sentence is natural; Socrates at the moment feels the value of Crito's enthusiasm, which is there in the present; but it may in the future, *i.e.* after argument, prove to have been displayed in a wrong cause.

5. τῶν ἐμῶν . . . πείθεσθαι : τῶν ἐμῶν includes both friends (*cp.* πείθου μοι, 5, 30) and impersonal advisers, such as conscience, interest, etc.

6. τῷ λόγῳ : "reasoning." Socratic reasoning attempted to arrive at definitions of various moral terms, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἀγαθόν, etc. These definitions or conceptions were called λόγοι. In practice he would consider whether an action came under the definition or not, and, having decided the point, act accordingly.

11. οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω : see note on 3, 4.

12. ἄν : *i.e.* ἐάν.

13. ὥσπερ . . . μορμολύττηται : Μορμώ was a boggy used by the Greeks to frighten children. In the famous Idyll of Theocritus the worldly mother, who does not want to take her little boy to a concert, says to him, Μορμώ, δάκνει ἵππος, "Boo! Bogies! There's a horse that bites." The words from ὥσπερ . . . μορμολύττηται are an instance of the Greek idiom by which a simile passes into a metaphor. δεσμούς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα : the plural is generic. Socrates speaks as if the people had a large choice of bogies of various kinds. ἐπιπέμπουσα : "bringing down upon us."

14. πῶς οὖν . . . αὐτά : αὐτά = the problem as to whether it is right to escape. The words constitute a rhetorical question, which is immediately answered by what follows.

15. εἰ πρῶτον μὲν . . . ταῖς δὲ οὐ : the apodosis of the conditional sentence is the affirmative of the preceding question.

15. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον . . . ὃν σὺ λέγεις : "this conception of yours"; for the meaning of λόγος, *cp.* 1. 6.

17. πότερον . . . ἢ οὐ : a question dependent on ἀναλάβοιμεν; in English a verb which can govern a dependent has to be introduced. ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε : the subject is λόγος, understood from what precedes, but in a slightly different sense, as it is now the conception Socrates had established in conversation on several

previous occasions (ἐκάστοτε), namely, that some opinions should be respected and not others. This conception may (1) be right, or (2) be wrong, or (3) it may be right at one time and wrong at another.

19. νῦν δὲ . . . ἐλέγετο : the subject of κατάδηλος is λόγος ; for the personal construction see note on 3, 16. ἄρα : "after all."

20. ἄλλως : "lightly." ἄλλως frequently means "to no purpose" ; it is explained by ἐνεκα λόγου, for the sake of argument.

23. καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν : see note on 4, 7.

25. ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν : "by people who thought they were talking seriously." λέγειν τι means "to talk sense," and οὐδὲν λέγειν "to talk nonsense."

29. ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια : "humanly speaking," or "in all human probability."

30. αὖριον : the precise date is indifferent to Socrates, who for the moment adopts Crito's view. See 2, 9.

31. παρακρούοι : probably a metaphor from wrestling, in which παρακρούειν would mean to throw a man off his balance.

34. πάντων : sc. ἀνθρώπων.

40. φρονίμων : for the significance of this word see note on 3, 23.

7. 1. πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο : πῶς means "was it rightly or wrongly?" τὰ τοιαῦτα refers to what follows ; the canon that correlatives ending in -οὗτος refer back, and correlatives in -δε forward, is a fiction of the grammarians. ἐλέγετο is in the imperfect, as the reference is to several previous discussions.

2. τοῦτο πράττων : "making that his pursuit."

11. καὶ ἐδεστέον γε : the insertion of the γε marks the fact that the two later verbals belong to a different series from the first two. The athlete must not only submit to direction in the actual gymnastics, but in diet as well.

12. ἐπιστάτη καὶ ἐπαῖοντι : ἐπιστάτης is a derivative of ἐφίσταμαι, "I am set over," but Socrates connects it with ἐπίσταμαι, "I know," which was possibly an older form of the same verb. ὁ ἐπαῖων in Plato means "the expert," "the man who understands."

15. ἀπειθήσας : conditional, "if he disobeys."

18. πέλλεται : future of πάσχω.

20. καὶ ποῖ . . . ἀπειθοῦντος : the more definite question εἰς τί (τείνει) τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος is an explanation of the more general ποῖ τείνει. Like τῶν ἐμῶν above (6, 5), τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος refers to

anything that could be regarded as a possession or even as an interest of the man in question.

23. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως : *sc.* ἐστί. τᾶλλα refers to other practical and artistic pursuits, such as music.

30. εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν : this form of conditional protasis is more vigorous and emphatic than εἰάν with the subjunctive.

31. δ . . . ἐγίγνετο . . . ἀπώλλυτο : “which, we saw, justice improved and injustice destroyed.” The reference is to the soul. The imperfects again go back to the time of previous discussions, and the positions established in those discussions are spoken of as if they were actual facts.

32. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο : οὐδέν, the adverbial accusative neuter, means “not at all,” and is often simply an emphatic οὐ.

34. οἶμαι ἔγωγε : “no, I think it is so.” The phrase is used to give an affirmative answer after a negative question, like *si* in French and *doch* in German.

Ch. 8.—*Socrates argues that with a maimed soul life is not worth living, and that, as to listen to the voice of the many in matters of right or wrong corrupts the soul, it is better to endure death at their hands than to listen to them. It is not mere living, but living well, that is valuable, and living well means living rightly.*

8. 1. τοῦ ὑγίεινός . . . τοῦ νοσώδους : both words are active in meaning, “what produces health, . . . what produces disease.”

3. πειθόμενοι μὴ . . . δόξῃ : the position of μὴ indicates that the latter half of the sentence is suppressed. It would be ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ, “but the opinion of the many.”

11. ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται : λωβῶμαι does not elsewhere govern the dative; *cp.* 7, 31. τὸ . . . δίκαιον . . . δικαιοσύνη : τὸ δίκαιον is concrete and means “acting justly,” whereas δικαιοσύνη means the abstract conception of justice.

19. τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς : καλῶς λέγειν, “to speak well of,” and κακῶς λέγειν, “to speak evil of,” are used with an accusative of the personal object. By an extension of the same idiom τί ἐροῦσιν governs the accusative ἡμᾶς here.

21. πρῶτον μὲν : Socrates has refuted Crito's first contention “that the opinion of the many (*i.e.* what the world thinks) should be taken into account.” We should expect ἔπειτα δέ to introduce the refutation of the argument by which Crito supported his first position, namely “that the many have the power of life and death.”

As it is, Socrates states Crito's second argument as an objection to his own, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, κ.τ.λ., and then confronts it with two propositions—(1) Life is not worth living with a maimed soul; (2) It is not living that is valuable, but living well. The first is merely referred to, οὗτος ὁ λόγος δὲν διεληλύθαμεν, "this reasoning we have gone through"; the second is explicitly stated and explained.

28. †ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον : "to be like what it was before." The MSS. have τῷ καὶ πρότερον, which would mean the same, but would not be Greek.

Ch. 9.—*Socrates introduces and emphasises the question which is to be discussed in the remainder of the dialogue, Is it right for him to escape?*

9. 1. ὁμολογουμένων : as the reference is to the present discussion the verb is present; cp. note on 4, 22.

3. μὴ ἀφιέντων : a variant for ἀκόντων.

4. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις : the antecedent to ἃς (αἱ σκέψεις), which should have been the subject, has been attracted into the relative clause, and in case assimilated to the relative. A new subject is therefore supplied in ταῦτα below.

6. μὴ . . . ἦ : μὴ with the subjunctive and ὅπως μὴ with the future indicative are used elliptically, depending upon some verb of fear or caution understood. Here, for instance, the sense is, "I am afraid your questions may prove to be the same as those of the many." The construction is repeated three times in the paragraph.

8. οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ : "without in any way using their reason."

9. τούτων τῶν πολλῶν : τούτων is contemptuous, and the position of τῶν πολλῶν, which is kept back till the end of the sentence, emphatic. The order cannot be kept in English. ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ : "reasoning so decides." αἰρῶ is technically used of securing a conviction, as ἀλίσκομαι is of being convicted. The Latin *convincio* has the same sense; so in English "conviction" means both "condemnation" and "an opinion established by reasoning."

11. χρήματα τελοῦντες . . . καὶ χάριτας : the meaning is that in bribing the jailors both expense and obligation will have to be incurred. The plural χάριτας balances the plural χρήματα, τελοῦντες χάριτας being equivalent to ἔχοντες χάριν.

13. αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι : αὐτοὶ includes both Socrates and his friends; it is then divided, ἐξάγοντες referring to the friends, and ἐξαγόμενοι to Socrates.

15. μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι . . . πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν : for the use of μὴ see above on l. 6. μὴ οὐ is equivalent to *ne non* after a verb of fearing in Latin. The sense is, "I am afraid it may not be right . . . etc." ὑπολογίζεσθαι means "to take into account," a metaphor from book-keeping. The two clauses εἰ δεῖ . . . ἀποθνήσκειν and εἰ δεῖ ἄλλο τι πάσχειν stand as objects to ὑπολογίζεσθαι, and πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, "rather than the fact that we should be doing wrong," is compared with them.

24. ὥς ἐγὼ . . . ἄκοντος : this is the reading of the MSS., and may be translated, "for I consider it important to persuade you to take this line of action, but not to force you against your will." With ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος, σου is to be understood, as well as an infinitive νικᾶν or κρατεῖν, which must be evolved from πείσαι. ταῦτα πράττειν must mean τὰ δίκαια πράττειν, but there is little or no reason why it should. There are two common emendations—(1) ὥς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσαι σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος ταῦτα πράττειν, "for I consider it important to persuade you and not to act in this matter without your consent," and (2) περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος, "I consider it important to persuade you before I act in the matter and not to act without your consent."

27. ἥ ἂν μάλιστα οἷη : "in the way you think best."

Ch. 10.—*Socrates forces Crito to admit, first that evil must not be repaid with evil, and secondly, as an application of theory, that if a man has entered into a just contract he must abide by it.*

10. 1. οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ . . . ἔκοντας ἀδικητέον : the use of the accusative to express the agent with the verbal in -τέος is not frequent before Plato.

6. ἐκκεχυμέναι : the metaphor is probably that of throwing cargo overboard, when the ship was in distress.

7. †τηλικοῖδε γέροντες ἄνδρες : "old men at our time of life." As γέροντες ἄνδρες is merely a repetition of τηλικοῖδε, many editors consider that it does not belong to the original text and omit it.

8. ἐλάθομεν . . . διαφέροντες : lit. "we escaped our own notice, being in no way different from children," i.e. "without knowing it ourselves, we were no better than children."

9. παντὸς μᾶλλον : lit. "more than everything," i.e. "beyond all doubt."

21. τί δὲ δῆ ; this phrase marks a new point.

26. κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους : κακῶς ποιεῖν, meaning "to harm,"

and other similar combinations of ποιεῖν with an adverb, govern an accusative of the direct object.

30. οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν : the subject of πάσχη is the same as the indefinite subject of ἀνταδικεῖν, in English "you," "one," or "we." ὑπ' αὐτῶν : i.e. ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων; Socrates is thinking of his own condemnation at the hands of men; cp. Ch. 16, 9.

35. καταφρονεῖν ὀρώντας : "look with contempt upon."

40. οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς : "you do not accept the premise." The two propositions established in this chapter serve as the major premise of a syllogism, for which the succeeding chapters provide the minor premise and conclusion. "All retaliation and repudiation of agreements is wrong; to escape is to retaliate against the laws and break an agreement with them, therefore to escape is wrong."

46. τῷ : i.e. τινι.

47. ἐξαπατητέον : οὐ ποιητέον is what we should expect, but for the sake of additional emphasis Plato uses a word which conveys moral censure, "cheat." So Socrates answers his own question, or rather his words beg the question.

Ch. 11-12.—Socrates now introduces the Laws of Athens, whom he pictures as advising him not to escape. In the first place, they argue, it would be wrong, because to break the laws is virtually to seek the dissolution of the state. Further the laws stand to Socrates in the relation of parents: they were responsible for his birth and upbringing. He is their child and slave. Therefore to destroy them is matricide and worse, for the laws have a higher claim than parents.

11. 3. καὶ ταῦτα : "and moreover." καὶ ἐμμένομεν . . . ἢ οὐ; the relative οἷς is assimilated to the case of its suppressed antecedent, which would be the dative after ἐμμένομεν. The words δικαίους οὖσιν are then made to agree with it.

7. μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν : "when I was intending"; the dative depends on ἐπιστάντες. ἐφίσταμαι is technically used of visions.

8. ἀποδιδράσκειν : "to abscond"; the word is used of slaves. εἴθ' ὅπως . . . τοῦτο : "or whatever we are to call it." The expression ἀποδιδράσκειν is softened down, out of consideration for Crito.

9. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως : "the community" or "commonwealth," Lat. *respublica*, as opposed to individual citizens, *ιδιωται*.

11. ἄλλο τι ἢ . . . διανοεῖ : lit. "Are you purposing anything else than?" "Surely your intention is." ἄλλο τι ἢ is a phrase

used commonly to introduce questions expecting an affirmative answer.

13. τοῖόν . . . ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι : "that a city can continue to exist." Some editors insert a second πόλιν before εἶναι, rendering the words "that a city can still be a city."

14. αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι : "decisions in a court of justice."

17. ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ : "more especially an orator." ἄλλως τε καί, which is adverbial, is, as a rule, only used with circumstantial participles and clauses. Here it is used with a noun. The allusion is probably to the Athenian custom of appointing συνήγοροι, "counsel," to defend any law which it was proposed to repeal. Socrates thus remarks with some irony, that an advocate might have a good deal to say, if it were a question of repealing the constitution.

20. ἡδίκηει . . . ἔκρινε : both tenses refer back to the time of Socrates' trial. ἡδίκηει, the imperfect, means "was in the wrong"; ἔκρινε, the aorist, refers to the verdict, a single decision.

12. 2. ὡμολόγητο : the pluperfect is used of an agreement made in the past and in force in the present.

3. αἷς ἂν . . . δικάζῃ : the subjunctive is used in a conditional relative clause in primary sequence, when the verb expresses an action which may be indefinitely repeated; in this case the subjunctive, which would have been used in the agreement, is graphically retained in historic sequence in the reported form.

3. εἰ . . . αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων : "if we expressed surprise at what they said," lit. "at them saying this."

4. ὅτι : is often used in dialogue to introduce a quotation.

6. ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι : the so-called dialectic method of question and answer.

7. φέρε : "come," a phrase used to call the attention of the person questioned. τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν . . . ἐπιχειρεῖς : the principal predication is expressed by the participle; render "With what do you charge us that you attempt?"

9. ἐλάμβανεν : "took to wife." The imperfect is used because the legal marriage is regarded as a process.

12. ἔχουσιν : dative of the participle in agreement with νόμοις.

13. τοῦ γενομένου : "of a child when born."

15. τούτοις : neuter. The reference is to τρόφη and παιδεία.

16. μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ : these were the two sides of Athenian education. μουσική covered all mental training, and

included reading, writing, literature, music, and, later, philosophy and rhetoric. *γυμναστική* was the physical training of the body.

19. *πρῶτον μὲν*: by a slight irregularity *πρῶτον μὲν* is answered by *καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει*.

21. *ἐξ ἴσου . . . ἡμῖν*: the sense is "do you think what is right for us is equally right for you?"

24. *πρὸς μὲν ἄρα . . . τὸν πατέρα*: this is balanced by *πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα* (l. 28). The argument is "what is not allowable in the case of a father is *a fortiori* not allowable in the case of a father-land."

25. *ἦν*: in the apodosis of conditional sentence *ἂν* is often omitted where the verb *εἰμί* is used. Similarly in Latin the indicative, instead of the subjunctive, of *sum* is common.

26. *ἐτύγχανεν*: the subject is *δεσπότης*, understood from what precedes.

27. *κακῶς ἀκούοντα*: *κακῶς ἀκούειν*, like *male audire* in Latin, means "to be abused," and is used as the passive of *κακῶς λέγειν*.

29. *†ἔξεσται*: "will it be permissible"; *sc. ἀντιλέγειν*, or the equivalent, to be supplied from what precedes. The sentence, however, requires either *ἔσται*, *sc. ἐξ ἴσου*, to balance the preceding *οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν*, or *ἐξ ἴσου ἔσται* in full. Both emendations have the same meaning—"and will what is right for your country be equally right for you?"

33. *ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ . . . ἐπιμελόμενος*: the article and participle are in apposition to the subject of *φήσεις*. The insertion of the article gives ironical emphasis. "You the man who, we know, gives so much attention to virtue."

36. *τιμιώτερον*: "a more precious thing."

38. *ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ*: "more to be had in honour." The expression is poetical and archaic in the Greek.

39. *σέβεσθαι δεῖ*: *ὅτι* is carried on from l. 35.

44. *τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον*: final future participles, "to be wounded or killed."

48. *ἢ πείθειν*: after the verbals *ποιητέον*, etc., the sentence reverts to the earlier form, with the infinitive, as in l. 39. *δεῖ* is here to be supplied. *ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε*: either (a) a question dependent on *πείθειν*, "where justice lies," *i.e.* "where she (the country) is wrong"; or (b) a relative clause, the antecedents being the preceding verbals and infinitive, "for there (*i.e.* in obeying, etc.) lies the right course."

Ch. 13-14.—*The laws further plead that as no one when of age is compelled to remain an Athenian citizen against his wish, the relation between them and the citizens is of the nature of a voluntary contract. Socrates himself had resided in the city all his life, thereby accepting the contract in its fullest sense.*

13. 2. εἰ ἡμεῖς . . . ἐπιχειρεῖς : both ἀληθῆ and δίκαια are predicative. Tr. "If we are right in saying that what you are now attempting to do to us is not just."

5. ὧν οἱοί τ' ἦμεν : sc. δοῦναι. The so-called assimilation of the relative to the case of the antecedent is the outcome of a tendency in Greek to treat the adjectival clause as a declinable adjective in agreement with the antecedent.

6. ὅμως προαγορεύομεν . . . βούληται : the words from τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι to νόμους are constructed as an instrumental dative depending on προαγορεύομεν. τῷ βουλομένῳ is the dative of the indirect object after ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι, and Ἀθηναίων the partitive genitive with τῷ βουλομένῳ. The direct object of προαγορεύομεν is ἐξεῖναι and the indirect object ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς. Translate, "Inasmuch as we have given freedom of choice to any Athenian who is of age and has seen the administration of the city and us the laws, we proclaim that whoever is not satisfied with us may take his belongings and go where he pleases." The Athenian democracy, that is, claimed to allow freedom of action to the individual.

7. ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῇ : every Athenian at the age of eighteen was examined before a magistrate. He had to demonstrate that he was of pure Athenian blood and able to serve in the army. This δοκιμασία was the first step towards citizenship.

12. ἀποικίαν : "an Athenian colony."

13. μετοικεῖν . . . ἐλθόν : "to go elsewhere and live in another state." μετοικεῖν means to live as a resident alien, μέτοικος.

16. τᾶλλα : adverbial accusative.

22. προτιθέντων ἡμῶν : editors disagree as to what is the object of this verb and consequently as to the punctuation of the passage. (a) If there is a stop after ἡμῶν, the object is to be supplied from what precedes, and would be ἢ πείθεσθαι ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς; translate "though we gave him the choice," sc. between obeying and convincing us. (b) If there is no stop after ἡμῶν, then the object is ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, translate "though we merely proposed that he should do what we told him." The passage then refers

back. Democracy offers a voluntary contract of obedience, whereas tyranny savagely dictates its will ; cp. 1. 6, and note.

14. 2. ἐνέξεσθαι : the future middle has here a passive sense.

3. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα : *sc.* ἐνεχομένοις ; see note on 1, 32.

4. καθάπτοιντο : “upbraid.”

6. ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν : internal accusative with ὁμολογηκώς. φαῖεν γὰρ ἄν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. : the first clause introduced by ὅτι is a quotation, the object of φαῖεν, cp. note, 12, 4 ; the second, ὅτι σοι, κ.τ.λ., explains τούτων, and τεκμήρια is explained by the clause introduced by γάρ (οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε, etc.).

9. τῶν ἄλλων . . . ἐπεδήμεις : “made it your home in a more special way than all the rest of the Athenians.”

11. ἐπὶ θεωρίαν : *i.e.* to be present at the Olympic Games or some other festival. ἐξῆλθες : as it was a fact that Socrates never left the city, the potential ἄν is not inserted ; that is to say, for the logical apodosis, “you would not have refrained from going,” the allied fact, “you did not go,” is substituted. †ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν : “except once to the Isthmian Games.” Plato knows nothing of a visit of Socrates to the Isthmian Games, and although a quotation shows that Athenaeus, 230 A.D., had the words in his copy of the Crito, it is probable that they were inserted in view of a later tradition.

12. στρατευσόμενος : for Socrates’ campaigns see Introduction, p. 10.

14. οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμία, κ.τ.λ. : the first οὐδέ throws special emphasis on the words which it introduces, “not only did you not go abroad, but you never even wished to.” The second οὐδέ emphasises νόμων as opposed to πόλεως, for the laws of Athens are speaking, and Socrates, as a philosopher, might be supposed to be particularly interested in constitutions. Notice that whereas in Greek πόλεως and νόμων are the objective genitives after ἐπιθυμία, in English “city” and “laws” must be the objects of “to observe,” εἰδέναι. The construction is an extension of the so-called σχῆμα Ἀττικόν, by which the subject of a dependent clause becomes the object of the principal clause, *e.g.* οἶδά σε τίς εἶ, “I know (thee) who thou art.”

17. πολιτεύσεσθαι : the verb means “to live as a citizen.”

18. τὰ τε ἄλλα . . . ἐποιήσω : τὰ τε ἄλλα is the adverbial accusative, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ = “and more particularly.” Notice the distinction in tense between ἦροῦ and ὁμολόγεις, imperfects which refer to all Socrates’ life, and ἐποιήσω, the aorist, which refers to special occasions.

20. φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι : φυγῆς is genitive of price. For the events of Socrates' trial see Introduction, p. 13.

25. οὐτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει : the λόγοι are almost personified, "what you said then makes you feel no shame," lit. "you are not ashamed in face of, etc."

31. ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ : "not as a mere form, but in reality."

33. ἄλλο τι ἢ : see note on 11, 11.

36. ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς : the pronoun is emphatic, not reflexive. παραβαίνεις : the laws speak as if Socrates were actually absconding.

41. ἃς δὴ . . . εὐνομεῖσθαι : "which you always say are well governed." The logic of the Spartan constitution, in which the interests of the individual were thoroughly subordinate to those of the state, always appealed to Greek thinkers. Sparta seemed a state governed by reason, in which everyone yielded unquestioning obedience to the laws. The constitution of Crete, which was also Dorian, was similar.

45. ἀνάπηροι : the word was used of anyone who suffered from a bodily defect.

46. δῆλον ὅτι : this phrase, which should introduce a dependent statement, is placed for emphasis at the end of the sentence. The dependent statement thus becomes direct, and δῆλον ὅτι merely adverbial.

Ch. 15-16.—*The laws proceed to prove that by escaping Socrates will be endangering his friends and gaining nothing for himself. He will be viewed with suspicion in well governed cities, and his action will have falsified his teaching and so made him dumb. To go to an ill-governed country like Thessaly will only be to disgrace himself further. His children will profit nothing by his being alive, unless he chooses to make exiles of them. It will moreover be better for him to go to the other world now when he can give a good account of himself, than later when he has broken his country's laws.*

15. 1. παραβὰς καὶ ἑξαμαρτάνων : observe the difference of tense, "committing an act of transgression, and being guilty."

4. στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως : i.e. "to be deprived of their political rights."

7. Θήβαζε ἢ Μεγάραδε : the suffixes ζε and δε are used to express place whither. εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι : both Thebes and Megara were governed by oligarchies, and as it was obedience to the law and not freedom that Socrates admired, he and his friends on the whole preferred oligarchy to democracy.

15. κοσμιωτάτους : “best-governed,” “most law-abiding.”

20. ἂν φανείσθαι : the future indicative with ἂν is commonly used in Homer to express a future statement less positive than one which would be expressed by the future, and less vague than one where the verb is in the optative with ἄν. In Attic a similar use is found rarely. The future infinitive with ἂν—a construction not found in Homer—should represent in a dependent statement the future indicative with ἂν in a direct statement. Some grammarians will not accept the use at all, and would alter the reading of all passages where it occurs.

21. τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα : a contemptuous expression, “Socrates and his doings.”

22. ἀπαρεῖς : “move,” a term suitable to an exile who travels from one city to another.

26. σκευήν τε . . . μεταλλάξας : σκευή means a disguise in dress, and is further explained by the two phrases introduced by ἢ, “either a peasant’s coat of skins or some other usual disguise.” τὸ σχῆμα . . . μεταλλάξας refers to other changes in appearance, such as might be effected by shaving or false hair.

28. ὅτι δὲ γέρων, κ.τ.λ. : the dependent statement is the object of ἐρεῖ (l. 31).

30. ἐτολμήσας : “had the effrontery to.” τολμῶ with the infinitive simply means “I have the moral or immoral qualities requisite for a certain action.”

31. οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ : short for οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν ὃς ἐρεῖ.

32. εἰ δὲ μή : “otherwise.” The phrase is used to introduce the second of two alternatives, even when, as here, the first is negative.

33. ἀνάξια σαντοῦ : “that would cause you shame.”

37. ἡμῖν : ethic dative, “we wonder.” ἀλλὰ δὲ : the words introduce an objection.

40. καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν : “that they may enjoy the additional pleasure of exile,” i.e. in addition to what they will have to face as being children of a criminal.

47. οἷεσθαί γε χρή : “you at least ought to think so,” an answer to the preceding question.

16. 3. εἰς Ἀίδου : sc. οἶκον, as we say to “St. Paul’s.” Hades was originally a god. ἵνα . . . ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι : πάντα ταῦτα is so placed as to be object to both verbs, i.e. the external object of ἔχῃς and the internal object of ἀπολογήσασθαι, “that you may have all this to plead in self-defence.”

4. τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν : those who rule there, *i.e.* in Hades.

5. οὔτε γὰρ . . . ἔσται : ἄμεινον ἔσται σοι means "it will be the better for you," and the other comparatives are similarly used. In English it is impossible to keep the impersonal neuter construction; render, "If you do this, neither you nor any of your friends are any the better or juster or holier for it here, nor will you be the better for it when you come thither." ἐκεῖ and ἐκεῖσε are frequently used of the other world.

8. οὐκ ὑφ' ἡμῶν . . . ἀνθρώπων : the laws are not to be blamed for the way in which men maladminister them.

22. μὴ πείσῃ : see note on Ch. 9, l. 6.

Ch. 17.—*The laws seem to Socrates to have made good their case, and he will stay. Crito accepts his master's decision.*

17. 1. ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων : a particularly intimate form of address, which Socrates uses to mitigate the severity of what he has said.

2. οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες : the worshippers of the Idaean Mother, Cybele. The rites were orgiastic, and music, especially that of flutes and cymbals, was used to kindle the necessary frenzy. The frenzy often continued after the music had ceased, so the worshippers still seemed to hear the flutes. It is possible that Socrates is speaking ironically of the restraining influence of the divine voice. See Introduction, p. 14.

5. ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα : adverbial accusative, "as far as I can see at present." Caution in affirming anything was characteristic of Socrates.

9. ἔα : imperative of ἐάω.

10. ὁ θεός : possibly the divine voice.

TEST PAPERS
ON
PLATO: CRITO.

FIRST SERIES.

TEST PAPER 1. (Ch. I.-IV.)

1. Translate :—(α) II., ll. 13-18, *ἐδόκει τίς . . . Κρίτων*.
(β) IV., ll. 21-29, *ἔτοιμος δέ . . . Θετταλῶν*.

2. Parse fully, giving the principal parts of verbs :—*παρεστῶση, ἐστερηῆσθαι, πραχθῆ, ἐκκλέψασι, εὐτελεῖς, πείσονται*.

3. Give the meaning of :—(α) *ὑπακούειν*, (β) *ὦ θαυμάσιε*, (γ) *συκοφάνται*, (δ) *πράγματα παρέχειν*, (ε) *ἐὼ χαίρειν*, (ς) *μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ*, (γ) *τηνικάδε*, (η) *πλημμελής*.

4. Put into Greek :—

- (α) And besides he is under some obligation to me.
(β) Their age does not free them from complaining of the misfortune that has befallen them.
(γ) My money is at your disposal.
(δ) I shall lose a friend, whose like I shall never find again.

TEST PAPER 2. (Ch. V.-VIII.)

1. Translate :—(a) VI., ll. 4-10, ὡς ἐγώ πρότερον.
 (b) VIII., ll. 18-25, οὐκ ἄρα ἀποκτινύναι.

2. Write down :—

- (a) 3rd plural aorist optative active of σπεύδω.
 (b) 1st plural future indicative active of περιμένω.
 (c) Nominative singular neuter of the verbal in -τέος of ἐσθίω.
 (d) 3rd singular present indicative active of διόλλυμι.
 (e) 1st plural aorist indicative active of διόλλυμι.
 (f) Genitive singular masculine perfect participle passive of διαφθείρω.

3. Give the meaning of :—(a) ἐπαῖω, (b) λέγειν τι, (c) λαβάω;
 (d) εἰσηγέομαι, (e) μετριώτατα, (f) ἐκάστοτε, (g) ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου
 ἐλέγετο, (h) φλυαρία.

4. Translate the following, and write grammatical notes on the words spaced :—

- (a) εἶ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ξυγχωρήσω.
 (b) τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ πεπραῆχθαι.
 (c) ἐλέγετο ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι δέοι τὰς
 μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιέισθαι.

TEST PAPER 3. (Ch. IX.-XII.)

1. Translate :—(a) X., ll. 33-41, οἷς οὖν ἀρχῆς.
 (b) XI., ll. 11-19, ἄλλο τι εἶναι.

2. Parse, giving the principal parts of verbs :—ἀφιέντων,
 ἐκκεχυμένοι, ἔρουντο, ἐξετράφης, λέληθε, ὑπείκτεον.

3. Give the meaning of :—(a) ἀναβιώσκομαι, (b) ὑπολογίζομαι,
 (c) ἐπιστῆναι, (d) θωπεύω, (e) τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, (f) σκέμμα, (g)
 ἀθρέω.

4. Translate the following and explain the case usages of the words spaced :—

- (a) ἡ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει.
 (b) τὸ γὰρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν
 διαφέρει.
 (c) εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν, ὅτι, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

TEST PAPER 4. (Ch. XIII.-XVII.)

1. Translate :—(a) XIII., ll. 18-24, καὶ τὸν μή....ποιεῖ.

(b) XV., ll. 14-21, πότερον οὖν....χρή.

2. Parse fully :—ἐνέξεσθαι, ἀκούσης, ξυνέθου, προήρου, διαφθορέα, βεβαιώσεις, λυπήσ.

3. Give the meaning of :—(a) κόσμος, (b) τολμάω, (c) καλλωπίζομαι, (d) ἀνάπηρος, (e) ἀκολασία, (f) διφθέρα, (g) εὐωχέομαι, (h) βομβέω.

4. Translate carefully :—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πῶποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες οὐτ' ἄλλοσε οὐδάμοσε εἰ μὴ στρατευσόμενος. Account for (a) the tenses of ἐπεδήμεις and στρατευσόμενος, and (b) the omission of ἂν with ἐξῆλθες.

SECOND SERIES.

TEST PAPER 5. (Ch. I.-IV.)

1. Translate :—(a) I., ll. 12-21, *εἴτα πῶς . . . φέρεις.*
(b) III., ll. 20-24, *εἰ γὰρ ὠφέλον . . . τύχῳσι.*
2. Write down :—
(a) Present infinitive active of *φοιτάω.*
(b) 2nd singular perfect indicative of *ἀφικνέομαι.*
(c) 2nd singular aorist imperative passive of *σώζω.*
(d) dative singular masculine perfect participle passive of *διαβάλλω.*
(e) 2nd singular present indicative middle of *φοβέω.*
(f) 3rd singular perfect indicative active of *κομίζω.*
3. Give the meaning of :—(a) ὀρθρος βαθύς, (b) ἣν ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἀν ἐνέγκαιμι, (c) ἐρίβωλος, (d) καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγείραί με, (e) ξένοι, (f) οἱ τούτων κύριοι.
4. Translate *two* of the following passages, with grammatical notes on the construction of the words spaced :—
(a) καὶ ἐπιτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδιστα διάγῃς.
(b) ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς οὐ μίᾳ ξυμφορᾷ ἐστίν.
(c) δίκαιοί ἐσμεν κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον.
(d) αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι.

TEST PAPER 6. (Ch. V.-VII.)

1. Translate :—(a) V., ll. 16-23, *ὡς ἔγωγε . . . ὄφελος ἦν.*
(b) VII., ll. 1-5, *φέρε δὴ . . . παιδοπρίβης ὧν ;*
 2. (a) Explain carefully the grammatical structure of the sentence set in 1 (a).
- OR
- give the Greek for *two* of the following :—
- (b) But reflect—or rather the time for reflection is past and the time for resolution come.
 - (c) You in all human probability are not going to die to-morrow.
 - (d) It is not living that we should set most store by, but living well.

3. Give the meaning and derivation of: (a) ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν, (b) ἀρετή, (c) μορμολύττω, (d) ἐπιστάτης, (e) τὸ νοσῶδες.

4. Write grammatical notes on the construction of the words spaced in *three* of the following:—

- (a) ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη.
- (b) καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;
- (c) διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο.
- (d) τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς;

TEST PAPER 7. (Ch. IX.-XII.)

1. Translate:—(a) IX., ll. 22-25, εἰ δὲ μή... ἄκοντος.
(b) XII., ll. 24-34, ἡ πρὸς... ἐπιμελόμενος.

2. Translate and explain *three* of the following:—

- (a) οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς.
- (b) δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ.
- (c) παρηγγέλλομεν τῇ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν.
- (d) πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε.

3. Explain the uses of the moods of the words spaced or underlined in the following:—

- (a) καὶ εἰ μὲν φαίνεται, πειρώμεθα.
- (b) μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέμματα ἦ τῶν πολλῶν.
- (c) ὄρα δέ, τί δρῶμεν.
- (d) “οὐ μέμφομαι,” φάλην ἄν.

4. Give the Greek for:—

- (a) Formerly, when we, old men as we were, discussed things seriously together, were we without knowing it no better than children?
- (b) Is it right, as the world says, to return evil for evil?
- (c) A fatherland is held in greater respect among the gods and among reasonable men than a father.

TEST PAPER 8. (Ch. XIII.-XVII.)

1. Translate :—(a) XIII., ll. 3-10, ἡμεῖς γάρ . . . βούληται.
(b) XVI., ll. 4-9, οὔτε γάρ . . . ἀνθρώπων.
2. Translate *three* of the following, with brief explanatory notes :—
(a) ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι.
(b) σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἀς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι.
(c) ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς ἐστὶ σφόδρα πονεῖ δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι.
(d) ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν.
3. Write grammatical comments on the words spaced in *three* of the following :—
(a) οὕτω σοὶ ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις δῆλον ὅτι.
(b) ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν ;
(c) ὅτι δὲ . . . ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν οὐδεὶς ὅς ἐρεῖ ; ἴσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ.
(d) ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων.
4. Parse, giving the derivation and meaning :—(a) μετοικεῖν,
(b) καθάπτειντο, (c) ἀπεδήμησας, (d) ἀπαρεῖς, (e) ὑπερχόμενος.

REVISION.

TEST PAPER 9. (Ch. I.-VIII.)

1. Translate :—(a) V., ll. 1-8, ἔτι δέ . . . πράξουσι.
(b) VIII., ll. 1-5, φέρε δὴ . . . ἢ οὐχί.
2. Put into Attic Greek :—ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.
3. Give the meaning of :—(a) ξυνήθης, (b) ἀπειθέω, (c) ῥάθυμος,
(d) παρακροῖω, (e) οἱ φρόνιμοι, (f) κατὰ γέλως, (g) ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τυχεῖ
ἀγαθῇ (sc. τελευτῇ).

4. Write down :—

- (a) 2nd singular aorist indicative active of ἐπεγείρω.
- (b) 1st singular aorist optative active of φέρω.
- (c) Future infinitive active (in use) of ἔρχομαι.
- (d) Nominative singular neuter of verbal in -τέος of πίνω.
- (e) 1st plural perfect indicative active of διέρχομαι.
- (f) Present infinitive passive of δέω. (“I bind”).
- (g) 1st plural future indicative active of διαφθείρω.

TEST PAPER 10. (Ch. IX.-XVII.)

1. Translate :—(a) IX., ll. 9-17, ἡμῶν δέ....ἀδικεῖν.
(b) XVII., ll. 1-5, ταῦτα....ἀκούειν.

2. *Either* account for the tenses of the words spaced in the following :—

- (a) σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων τι
τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτόν.
- (b) ἢ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ἡδίκηει ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην
ἔκρινε ;
- (c) καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἀσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους
πρᾶγμα ;

Or answer *one only* of (a), (b), (c), and write a note upon the grammar of the conditional sentence :—

- (d) ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου.

3. Give the meaning of :—(a) λείπειν τὴν τάξιν, (b) χωλός, (c) πολιτεύομαι, (d) ὑποβλέπω, (e) τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας, (f) ἀντικακουργεῖν.

4. Give the Greek for *two* of the following :—

- (a) You are accustomed to employ the method of question and answer.
- (b) What charge have you to bring, that you attempt to destroy us?
- (c) You were not seized with the desire of becoming acquainted with another city or other institutions.

ἐνεργείται ὑπὸ τοῦ
καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ

VOCABULARY.

- ✓✓ 1. 1. *τηνικάδε* adv., *at this hour*.
 ✓✓ *ἀφίξαι* ἀφ-ικνέομαι, -ίξομαι, -ικόμην, -ίγμαι, *arrive*.
 ✓✓ *πρῶ* adv., *early*.
 ✓✓ 3. *πάνυ* adv., *very*.
 ✓✓ 4. *πηνίκα* adv., *at what point of time?*
 ✓✓ *μάλιστα* adv., superl. of *μάλα*, *most, for the most part*.
 ✓✓ 5. *ὄρθρος* ὄρθρος, -ου, ὅ, *daybreak, dawn*.
 ✓✓ *βαθύς* βαθύς, βαθεῖα, βαθύ, *deep*.
 ✓ 6. *θαυμάζω* θαυμάζω, θαυμάσομαι, ἐθαύμασα, τεθαύμακα, ἐθαυμάσθην, *wonder*.
 ✓ *ἠθέλησε* ἐθέλω and θέλω, ἐθελήσω and θελήσω, ἠθέλησα, ἠθέληκα, *be willing*.
 ✓✓ *δεσμωτηρίου* δεσμωτήριον, -ου, τό, *prison*.
 ✓✓ 7. *φύλαξ* φύλαξ, φύλακος, ὁ, *guardian, keeper*.
 ✓✓ *ὑπακούσαι* ὑπ-ακούω, -ακούσομαι, -ήκουσα, -ακήκοα, -ηκούσθην, *listen, let in*.
 ✓✓ 8. *ξυνήθης* ξυνήθης, -ες, *well acquainted with*.
 ✓✓ 9. *πολλάκις* adv., *often*.
 ✓✓ *δεῦρο* adv., *hither*.
 ✓✓ *φοιτᾶν* φοιτάω, -ήσω, *come*.
 ✓✓ *εὐεργέτηται* εὐεργετέω, -ήσω, *show kindness to*.
 ✓✓ 10. *ἄρτι* adv., *just now*.
 ✓✓ *ἦκεις* ἦκω, ἦξω, *have come*.
 ✓✓ *πάλαι* ... adv., *long*.
 ✓✓ 11. *ἐπιεικῶς* adv., *fairly*.
 ✓✓ 12. *εἶτα* adv., *then*.
 ✓✓ *εὐθύς* adv., *at once*.
 ✓ *ἐπήγειρας* ἐπ-εγείρω, -εγερῶ, -ήγειρα, -εγρήγορα (intrans.), -εγήγερμαι, -ηγέρθην, *rouse*.
 ✓✓ *σιγῇ* σιγή, -ῆς, ἡ, *silence*; dat. as adv., *in silence*.
 ✓ 13. *παρακάθῃσαι* παρακάθηναι, perf. with pres. sense, *sit by*.
 ✓ 15. *τοσαύτη* τοσοῦτος, τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτό or τοσοῦτον, *so much*.
 ✓✓ *ἀγρυπνία* ἀγρυπνία, -ας, ἡ, *sleeplessness*.
 ✓✓ *λύπη* λύπη, -ης, ἡ, *sorrow*.
 ✓ 16. *αἰσθανόμενος* αἰσθάνομαι, αἰσθήσομαι, ᾗσθόμην, ᾗσθημαι, *perceive*.
 ✓✓ *ἠδέως* adv., *sweetly*.
 ✓✓ *καθεύδεις* καθεύδω, καθευδήσω, *sleep*.

1. 17. ἐπίτηδες adv., *on purpose*.
 ✓ ἔγειρον ἐγείρω, ἐγερῶ, ἡγείρα, ἐγρήγορα (intrans.),
 ἐγήγερμαι, ἡγέρθην, *wake*.
 ✓✓ ἡδίστα superl. adv. of ἡδέως, *pleasantly*.
 ✓ διάγῃς δι-άγω, -άξω, -ήγαγον, -ῆχα, -ῆγμαι, -ήχθην,
live, pass one's time.
 ✓✓ 18. πρότερον adv., *before*.
 ✓✓ βίῳ βίος, -ου, ὁ, *life*.
 ✓✓ 19. εὐδαιμόνισα εὐδαιμονίζω, -ιῶ, *account happy*.
 ✓✓ τρόπου τρόπος, -ου, ὁ, *way, disposition*.
 ✓ 20. παρεστῶση παρ-ίστημι, παρα-στήσω, παρ-έστησα and
 (intrans.) παρ-έστην, -έστηκα (intrans.),
 -έσταμαι, -εστάθην, *stand by, be near*.
 ✓✓ ξυμφορᾷ ξυμφορά, -ās, ἡ, *trouble*.
 ✓✓ ῥαδίως adv., *easily*.
 ✓✓ πρᾶως adv., *calmly*.
 ✓ 21. φέρεις φέρω, οἶσω, ἤνεγκα and ἤνεγκον, ἐνήνοχα,
 ἐνήνεγμαι, ἤνέχθην, *bear*.
 ✓✓ 22. πλῆμμελές πλημμελής, -ές, *out of tune, unreasonable*.
 ✓ ἀγανακτεῖν ἀγανακτέω, -ήσω, *complain*.
 ✓ 23. τηλικούτον τηλικούτος, τηλικαύτη, τηλικούτο and τηλικ-
 οῦτον, *so old*.
 ✓✓ δεῖ impers., δεῖ, δεήσει, ἐδέησε, *there is need*.
 ✓✓ τελευτᾶν τελευτάω, -ήσω, *end, die*.
 ✓✓ 24. ἄλλοι ἄλλος, ἄλλη, ἄλλο, *other*.
 ✓ 25. ἀλίσκονται ἀλίσκομαι, ἀλώσομαι, ἤλων and ἐάλων, ἤλωκα
 and ἐάλωκα, *be captured, be overtaken*.
 ✓✓ ἐπιλύεται ἐπι-λύω, -λύσω, *loose, release*.
 ✓✓ 26. ἡλικία ἡλικία, -ας, ἡ, *age*.
 ✓✓ παρούση πάρεμι, παρέσομαι, *be present*.
 ✓✓ 27. τύχη τύχη, -ης, ἡ, *chance, fortune*.
 ✓ 29. ἀγγελίαν ἀγγελία, -ας, ἡ, *message, news*.
 ✓✓ χαλεπήν χαλεπός, -ή, -όν, *hard to bear*.
 ✓✓ 30. φαίνεται φαίνω, φανῶ, ἔφηνα, πέφαγκα or πέφηνα,
 πέφασμαι, ἐφάνην, *show*.
 ✓ 31. ἐπιτηδεῖοις ἐπιτήδειος, -α, -ον, *friendly*.
 ✓ βαρεῖαν βαρύς, βαρεῖα, βαρύ, *heavy, grievous*.
 ✓ δοκῶ δοκέω, δόξα, ἔδοξα, δέδογμαι, ἐδόχθην, *seem, think*.
 ✓ 32. βαρύτατα superl. adv. of βαρέως, *very painfully*.
 ✓✓ ἐνέγκαιμι φέρω, οἶσω, ἤνεγκα or ἤνεγκον, ἐνήνοχα,
 ἐνήνεγμαι, ἤνέχθην, *bear*.
 ✓✓ 33. πλοῖον πλοῖον, -ου, τό, *ship*.
 ✓ 34. τεθνάναι θνήσκω, θανοῦμαι, ἔθανον, τέθνηκα, *die*.
 ✓ 36. τήμερον adv., *to-day*.
 ✓ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἀπ-αγγέλλω, -αγγελῶ, -ήγγειλα, -ήγγελκα,
 -ήγγελμαι, -ηγγέλθην, *announce*.
 37. καταλιπόντες κατα-λείπω, -λείψω, κατ-έλιπον, κατα-λέλοιπα,
 -λέλειμμαι, κατ-ελείφθην, *leave behind*.

VOCABULARY.

11

- ✓✓ 1. 37. ἐκεῖ..... adv., *there*.
 ✓✓ δῆλον δῆλος, -η, -ον, *clear*.
 ✓✓ 38. ἀνάγκη ἀνάγκη, -ης, ἡ, *necessity*.
 ✓✓ αὔριον adv., *to-morrow*.
 ✓✓ 39. τελευτᾶν τελευτάω, -ήσω, *end, die*.
 ✓✓ 2. 1. ἀγαθῇ ἀγαθός, -ή, -όν, *good*.
 ✓✓ 2. θεοῖς θεός, -οῦ, ὁ, *god*.
 ✓✓ φίλον φίλος, -η, -ον, *dear*.
 ✓✓ μέντοι adv., *however*.
 ✓✓ οἶμαι οἶμαι, οἴησομαι, ᾤθη, *think*.
 ✓✓ 4. πόθεν adv., *whence?*
 ✓✓ τεκμαίρει τεκμαίρομαι, τεκμαροῦμαι, ἐτεκμηράμην, *infer*.
 ✓✓ 5. ἐρῶ (λέγω), ἐρῶ, (εἶπον), εἶρηκα, εἶρημαι, ἐρρήθην, *say, tell*.
 ✓✓ που adv., *I suppose*.
 ✓✓ ὕστεραίᾳ ὕστεραίος, -α, -ον, *on the day after*.
 ✓✓ 6. ἀποθνήσκειν ἀπο-θνήσκω, -θανοῦμαι, ἀπ-έθανον, ἀπο-τέθνηκα, *die*.
 ✓✓ ἔλθῃ ἔρχομαι, (ἐλεύσομαι), ἦλθον, ἐλήλυθα, *go, come*.
 ✓✓ 7. φασί..... φημί, φήσω, ἔφησα, *say*.
 ✓✓ κύριοι κύριος, -α, -ον, *having authority*.
 ✓✓ 8. τοίνυν *so then, therefore*.
 ✓✓ ἐπιούσης ἔπ-ειμι, *come on, follow*.
 ✓✓ 9. ἑτέρας ἕτερος, -α, -ον, *the other, one of two, second*.
 ✓✓ ἐνυπνίου ἐνύπνιον, -ον, τό, *dream*.
 ✓✓ 10. ἑώρακα ὁράω, ὄψομαι, εἶδον, ἑώρακα or ἐόρακα, ἐώραμαι or ὤμμαι, ὥφθην, *see*.
 ✓✓ ὀλίγον ὀλίγος, -η, -ον, *little; neut. as adv., a little*.
 ✓✓ νυκτός νύξ, νυκτός, ἡ, *night*.
 ✓✓ κινδυνεύεις κινδυνεύω, -σω, *be likely to, seem*.
 ✓✓ 11. καιρῷ καιρός, καιροῦ, ὁ, *fitness*.
 ✓✓ 13. γυνή..... γυνή, γυναικός, ἡ, *woman*.
 ✓✓ προσελθοῦσα προσ-έρχομαι, (-ελεύσομαι), -ἦλθον, -ελήλυθα, *come to*.
 ✓✓ καλή..... καλός, -ή, -όν, *beautiful*.
 ✓✓ 14. εὐειδής εὐειδής, -ές, *well-shaped, fair*.
 ✓✓ λευκά λευκός, -ή, -όν, *white*.
 ✓✓ ἱμάτια ἱμάτιον, -ον, τό, *outer garment*.
 ✓✓ ἔχουσα ἔχω, ἔξω or σχήσω, ἔσχον, ἔσχηκα, ἔσχημαι, ἔσχέθην, *have*.
 ✓✓ καλέσαι καλέω, καλῶ, ἐκάλεσα, κέκληκα, κέκλημαι, ἐκλήθην, *call*.
 ✓✓ εἰπεῖν λέγω, ἐρῶ, εἶπον, εἶρηκα, εἶρημαι, ἐρρήθην, *say*.
 ✓✓ 16. ἡματι ἡμαρ, ἡματος, τό (poetic for ἡμέρα), *day*.
 ✓✓ κεν Ep. and Ion. for ἄν.
 ✓✓ τριτάτῳ τρίτατος, -η, -ον (Ep. for τρίτος), *third*.
 ✓✓ ἐρίβωλον ἐρίβωλος, -ον, *very fertile*.
 ✓✓ ἴκοιο ἰκνέομαι, ἴζομαι, ἰκόμην, ἴγμαι, *come*.
 ✓✓ 17. ἄτοπον ἄτοπος, -ον, *absurd*.

- ✓ 2. 18. ἐναργές ἐναργής, -ές, *plain*.
3. 1. λίαν adv., *too much*.
 ἔοικεν (εἶκω), εἶξω, ἔοικα, *appear*.
 δαιμόνιε δαιμόνιος, -η, -ον, *good, dear*.
2. πείθου πείθω, πείσω, ἔπεισα, πέπεικα and (intrans.)
 πέποιθα, πέπεισμαι, ἐπείσθην, *persuade*.
 σώθητι σῶζω, σώσω, ἔσωσα, σέσωκα, σέσωμαι or
 σέσωσμαι, ἐσώθην, *save*.
3. χωρίς prep., *apart from, besides*.
4. ἐστερηῆσθαι στερέω, στερήσω, ἐστέρησα, ἐστέρηκα, ἐστέρ-
 ημαι, ἐστερήθην, *deprive*.
5. εὐρήσω εὐρίσκω, εὐρήσω, ἤρηκα, ἤρημαι, ἠρέθην, *find*.
6. σαφῶς adv., *clearly, well*.
 ἴσασιν οἶδα, εἴσομαι, *know*.
 οἶος οἶος, -α, -ον, *such as*; οἶός τε, *able*.
 ἀναλίσκειν ἀναλίσκω, ἀναλώσω, ἀνάλωσα and ἀνήλωσα,
 ἀνάλωκα and ἀνήλωκα, ἀνάλωμαι and
 ἀνήλωμαι, ἀναλώθην and ἀνηλώθην, *expend*.
7. χρήματα χρήμα, -ματος, τό, *a thing*; plur., *goods, money*.
 ἀμελήσαι ἀμελέω, -ήσω, *neglect*.
 καίτοι *and yet*.
 αἰσχίων comp. of αἰσχύρος, -ά, -όν, *base*.
8. δόξα δόξα, -ης, ἡ, *reputation*.
 πλείονος πλείων or πλέων, πλείον or πλέον, -ονος,
more, comp. of πολὺς.
 ποιεῖσθαι ποιέω, -ήσω, *make*.
10. ἀπιέναι ἀπείμι, *go away*.
 ἐνθένδε adv., *hence*.
 προθυμουμένων προθυμέομαι, -ήσομαι, *be anxious, eager*.
11. μακάριε μακάριος, -α, -ον, *good*.
12. μέλει μέλει, μελήσει, ἐμέλησε, μεμέληκε, *it concerns*.
 ἐπιεικέστατοι ἐπιεικής, -ές, *fair*.
13. μᾶλλον adv., comp. of μάλα, *more*.
 ἄξιον ἄξιος, -α, -ον, *worthy*.
 φροντίζειν φροντίζω, -ιῶ, *consider*.
 ἡγήσονται ἡγέομαι, ἡγήσομαι, ἡγησάμην, ἡγημαι, *think*.
 πεπραῖχθαι πράσσω, πράξω, ἔπραξα, πέπραχα or (intrans.)
 πέπραγα, πέπραγμα, ἐπράχθην, *do*.
16. μέλειν μέλω, μελήσω, μεμέλημαι, *care for*.
17. σμικρότατα superl. of σμικρός, -ά, -όν, *little*.
18. κακῶν κακός, -ή, -όν, *bad, evil*.
 ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἐξ-εργάζομαι, -εργάσομαι, -εργασάμην, -εργ-
 γασμαι, -εργάσθην, *do*.
 μέγιστα superl. of μέγας, μεγάλη, μέγα, *great*.
 σχεδόν adv., *nearly*.
19. διαβεβλημένος δια-βάλλω, -βαλῶ, δι-έβαλον, δια-βέβληκα,
 -βέβλημαι, δι-εβλήθην, *accuse falsely, slander*.

3. 20. ὄφελον ὀφείλω, ὀφειλήσω, ὀφείλησα or ὄφελον, *ought*.
 21. ἐργάζεσθαι ἐργάζομαι, ἐργάσομαι, εἰργασάμην, εἰργασμαι, εἰργάσθην, *do*.
 22. καλῶς adv., *well*.
 23. φρόνιμον φρόνιμος, -η, -ον, *wise*.
 ἄφρονα ἄφρων, ἄφρον, *foolish*.
 24. δυνατοί δυνατός, -ή, -όν, *able*.
 τύχῳσι τυγχάνω, τεύξομαι, τετύχηκα or τέτευχα, ἔτυχον, *happen*.
 4. 2. προμηθεῖ προμηθεόμαι, -ήσομαι, *take forethought for*.
 4. συκοφάνται συκοφάντης, -ου, ὁ, *informer*.
 πράγματα πρᾶγμα, -ματος, τό, *deed*; plur., *business, trouble*.
 παρέχουσιν παρ-έχω, -έξω or παρα-σχήσω, παρ-έσχον, -έσχηκα, *afford, give*.
 5. ἐκκλέψασι ἐκ-κλέπτω, -κλέψω, ἐξ-έκλεψα, ἐκ-κέκλοφα, -κέκλεμμαι, ἐξ-εκλάπην, *remove stealthily*.
 ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἀναγκάζω, -άσω, *compel*.
 οὐσίαν οὐσία, -ας, ἡ, *property*.
 6. ἀποβαλεῖν ἀπο-βάλλω, -βαλῶ, ἀπ-έβαλον, ἀπο-βέβληκα, -βέβλημαι, ἀπ-εβλήθην, *lose*.
 συχνά συχνός, -ή, -όν, *much*.
 7. φοβῇ φοβέω, -ήσω, *frighten*; pass. *fear*.
 ἔασον ἔάω, ἔάσω, εἶασα, εἶακα, εἶμαι, εἶάθην, *permit*.
 χαίρειν χαίρω, χαιρήσω, κεχάρηκα, κεχάρημαι or κέχαρμαι, ἐχάρην, *rejoice*.
 8. δίκαιοι δίκαιος, -α, -ον, *just, right*.
 κινδυνεύειν κινδυνεύω, -σω, *run a risk*.
 9. κίνδυνον κίνδυνος, -ου, ὁ, *danger, risk*.
 10. ἄλλως adv., *otherwise*.
 14. ἀργύριον ἀργύριον, -ου, τό, *money*.
 λαβόντες λαμβάνω, λήψομαι, ἔλαβον, εἴληφα, εἴλημμαι, ἐλήφθην, *take*.
 15. ἔπειτα adv., *then*.
 συκοφάντας συκοφάντης, -ου, ὁ, *informer*.
 16. εὐτελεῖς εὐτελής, -ές, *cheap*.
 17. ὑπάρχει ὑπ-άρχω, -άρξω, -ῆρξα, -ῆρχα, -ῆργμαι, -ῆρχθην, *be ready, be*.
 18. ἱκανά ἱκανός, -ή, -όν, *sufficient*.
 κηδόμενος κήδω, κηδήσω, *make anxious*; pass. *be concerned for*.
 19. ξένοι ξένος, -ου, ὁ, *foreigner*.
 ἐνθάδε adv., *here*.
 ἔτοιμοι ἔτοιμος, -η, -ον, *ready*.
 20. κεκόμικεν κομίζω, κομιῶ, ἐκόμισα, κεκόμικα, κεκόμισμαι, ἐκομίσθην, *bring*.
 22. πολλοί πολὺς, πολλή, πολύ, *many*.
 23. ἀποκάμης ἀπο-κάμνω, -καμοῦμαι, -κέκμηκα, ἀπ-έκαμον, *grow weary, shrink*.

4. 23. σαυτόν σαυτόν, σαυτήν, *thyself*.
 24. δυσχερές δυσχερής, -ές, *troublesome*.
 γενέσθω γίγνομαι, γενήσομαι, γέγονα, γεγένημαι,
 ἐγενόμην, *become*.
 25. χρῶο χράομαι, χρήσομαι, ἐχρησάμην, κέχρημαι,
use.
 πολλαχοῦ adv., *in many places*.
 ἄλλοσε adv., *to another place*.
 26. ὅποι adv., *whither*.
 ἀγαπήσουσι ἀγαπάω, ἀγαπήσω, *welcome, love*.
 βούλη βούλομαι, βουλήσομαι, ἐβουλήθην, βεβούλημαι,
wish.
 28. ἀσφάλειαν ἀσφάλεια, -ας, ἡ, *safety*.
 29. λυπεῖν λυπέω, λυπήσω, *pain, annoy*.
 5. 2. ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐπιχειρέω, ἐπιχειρήσω, *attempt*.
 προδοῦναι προ-δίδωμι, -δώσω, προῦδωκα, προ-δέδωκα,
 -δέδομαι, προῦδόθην, *betray, give up*.
 ἐξόν ἔξεστι, ἔξεσται, *it is possible*.
 3. σπεύδεις σπεύδω, σπεύσω, ἔσπευσα, *be eager*.
 4. ἐχθροί ἐχθρός, -ά, -όν, *hostile*; ἐχθρός, ὁ, *enemy*.
 διαφθεῖραι δια-φθείρω, -φθερῶ, δι-έφθειρα, -έφθαρκα,
 -έφθαρμαι, -εφθάρην, *destroy*.
 5. υἱεῖς υἱός, υἱοῦ or υἱέος, ὁ, *son*.
 6. ἐκθρέψαι ἐκ-τρέφω, -θρέψω, ἐξ-έθρεψα, ἐκ-τέτροφα,
 -τέθραμμαι, ἐξ-ετράφην, *bring up from childhood*.
 7. ἐκπαιδεῦσαι ἐκ-παιδεύω, -παιδεύσω, *educate*.
 οἰχήσει οἶχομαι, οἰχήσομαι, οἶχωκα or ὥχωκα, *be gone*.
 καταλιπών κατα-λείπω, -λείψω, κατ-έλιπον, κατα-
 λέλοιπα, -λέλειμμαι, κατ-ελείφθην, *abandon*.
 μέρος μέρος, μέρους, τό, *part, share*.
 8. τεύξονται τυγχάνω, τεύξομαι, ἔτυχον, τετύχηκα or
 τέτευχα, *meet with*.
 εἰκός ἔοικα, ἐφκή, *be fitting, likely*.
 9. εἴωθεν εἴωθα, εἰώθη, *be accustomed*.
 ὀρφανίαις ὀρφανία, -ας, ἡ, *orphanhood*.
 10. ὀρφανούς ὀρφανός, -ή, -όν, *left orphan*.
 χρή χρή, *impers., there is need, (one) ought*.
 παῖδας παῖς, παιδός, ὁ and ἡ, *child*.
 11. ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν ... ξυνδια-ταλαιπωρέω, -ήσω, *take all the trouble*.
 12. ῥαθυμότατα superl. of ῥάθυμος, -ον, *slothful*.
 αἰρεῖσθαι αἰρέω, αἰρήσω, εἶλον, ἤρηκα, ἤρημαι, ἠρέθην,
 take; mid. *choose*.
 13. ἀνδρεῖος ἀνδρεῖος, -α, -ον, *manly, brave*.
 14. φάσκοντα φάσκω, *say*.
 ἀρετῆς ἀρετή, -ῆς, ἡ, *virtue*.
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐπι-μελέομαι, -μελήσομαι, *pay attention to*.
 17. αἰσχύνομαι αἰσχύνω, αἰσχυνῶ, ἤσχυνα, ἠσχύνθην; *pass*.
feel shame.

5. 18. ἀνανδρία ἀνανδρία, -ίας, ἡ, *cowardice*.
 εἴσοδος εἴσοδος, -ου, ἡ, *entry*.
19. δίκης δίκη, -ης, ἡ, *law-suit, case*.
 εἰσῆλθεν εἰσ-έρχομαι, (-ελεύσομαι), -ελήλυθα, -ῆλθον, *go into*.
20. ἀγών ἀγών, ἀγῶνος, ὁ, *contest, pleading*.
21. τελευταῖον τελευταῖος, -α, -ον, *last*.
 κατάγελως κατάγελως, -ωτος, ὁ, *ridicule, ridiculous conclusion*.
- πράξεως πράξις, -ews, ἡ, *doing, affair*.
22. κακία κακία, -ας, ἡ, *baseness*.
 διαπεφευγέναι δια-φεύγω, -φεύξομαι and -φευξοῦμαι, δι-έφυγον, δια-πέφευγα, *escape, evade*.
24. δυνατόν δυνατός, -ής, -όν, *possible*.
 ὄφελος ὄφελος, -ους, τό, *help*.
25. ἅμα *prep., together with*.
26. βουλεύου βουλεύω, βουλεύσω, *consider*.
27. ὥρα ὥρα, -ας, ἡ, *time*.
 βουλή βουλή, -ῆς, ἡ, *plan, course*.
29. περιμενοῦμεν περι-μένω, -μενῶ, -έμεινα, -μεμένηκα, *wait*.
 ἀδύνατον ἀδύνατος, -ον, *impossible*.
 οὐκέτι *adv., no longer*.
30. μηδαμῶς *adv., by no means*.
6. 1. προθυμία προθυμία, -ας, ἡ, *enthusiasm*.
 2. ὀρθότητος ὀρθότης, -τητος, ἡ, *right*.
 3. σκοπεῖσθαι σκοπέομαι, *consider*. or εἰκοπέω, σκεψάμαι, εἰ-
 6. λογιζομένῳ λογίζομαι, λογιῶμαι, *think*.
 βέλτιστος βέλτιστος, -η, -ον, *best, superl. of ἀγαθός*.
 7. ἔμπροσθεν *adv., before*.
 δύναμαι δύναμαι, δυνήσομαι, δεδύνημαι, ἐδυνήθην, *be able, can*.
8. ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ-βάλλω, -βαλῶ, ἐξ-έβαλον, ἐκ-βέβληκα, -βέβλημαι, ἐξ-εβλήθην, *throw away*.
 ἐπειδή *conj., since, because*.
9. ὅμοιοι ὅμοιος, -α, -ον, *like*.
 πρεσβεύω πρεσβεύω, πρεσβεύσω, *put first in rank, respect*.
10. τιμῶ τιμάω, τιμήσω, *honour*.
 οὕσπερ οὕσπερ, ἥπερ, ὅπερ, *who, which indeed*.
 βελτίῳ βελτίων, -ον, *better, comp. of ἀγαθός*.
11. ξυγχωρήσω ξυγχωρέω, ξυγχωρήσω, *agree with*.
12. πλείῳ πλείων, -ον, *more, comp. of πολὺς*.
 δύναμις δύναμις, -ews, ἡ, *power*.
13. μορμολύττηται μορμολύττομαι, *scare*.
 δεσμούς δεσμός, -οῦ, ὁ, *fetter, imprisonment*.
 θανάτους θάνατος, -ου, ὁ, *death*.
14. ἐπιπέμπουσα ἐπι-πέμπω, -πέμψω, ἐπ-έπεμψα, ἐπι-πέπομφα, -πέπεμμαι, ἐπ-επέμφθην, *inflict upon*.
 ἀφαιρέσεις ἀφαίρεσις, -ews, ἡ, *taking away, fine*.

6. 15. μετριώτατα..... *most easily, fairly, superl. adv. of μέτριος.*
 16. ἀναλάβοιμεν ἀνα-λαμβάνω, -λήψομαι, ἀν-έλαβον, -είληφα, -είλημμαι, -ελήφθην, *take up.*
 17. ἐκάστοτε *adv., each time, always.*
 18. προσέχειν..... προσ-έχω, -έξω or -σχῆσω, -έσχον, -έσχηκα, -έσχημαι, -εσχέθην, *turn to.*
 νοῦν νοῦς, νοῦ, ὁ, *mind, attention.*
 19. κατὰδηλος κατὰδηλος, -ον, *very plain, apparent.*
 20. ἔνεκα *prep., for the sake of.*
 παιδιά παιδιά, -ās, ἡ, *child's play.*
 21. φλυαρία φλυαρία, -ας, ἡ, *nonsense.*
 ἀληθῶς *adv., truly.*
 ἐπιθυμῶ ἐπι-θυμέω, -θυμήσω, *desire.*
 ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐπι-σκέπτομαι, -σκέψομαι, ἐπ-εσκεψάμην, -έσκεμμαι, *inquire.*
 22. κοινῇ..... *dat. fem. of κοινός, used as adv., in common.*
 25. πῶς *adv., in some way.*
 27. δοξάζουσι δοξάζω, δοξάσω, *think, believe.*
 30. ἀνθρώπεια..... ἀνθρώπειος, -α, -ον, *human.*
 ἐκτός *prep., out of, far from.*
 μέλλειν μέλλω, μελλήσω, ἐμέλλησα, *be on the point of, be destined.*
 31. παρακρούοι παρα-κρούω, -κρούσω, παρ-έκρουσα, παρα-κέκρουκα, -κέκρουμαι and -κέκρουσμαι, παρ-εκρούσθην, *mislead.*
 36. χρηστάς χρηστός, -ή, -όν, *good.*
 πονηράς πονηρός, -ή, -όν, *bad.*
 38. ναί *adv., yes.*
 7. 2. γυμναζόμενος γυμνάζω, γυμνάσω, *train, exercise.*
 3. ἐπαινῶ ἐπαινος, -ου, ὁ, *praise.*
 ψόγῳ..... ψόγος, -ου, ὁ, *blame.*
 4. ἱατρός ἱατρός, -οῦ, ὁ, *physician.*
 παιδοτρίβης παιδοτρίβης, -ου, ὁ, *trainer.*
 7. ἀσπάξεσθαι ἀσπάζομαι, ἀσπάσομαι, *welcome kindly, be glad to receive.*
 11. γυμναστέον *one must exercise, verbal adj. of γυμνάζω.*
 12. ἐδεστέον *one must eat, verbal adj. of ἐσθίω.*
 ποτέον *one must drink, verbal adj. of πίνω.*
 ἐπιστάτῃ ἐπιστάτης, -ου, ὁ, *master.*
 13. ἐπαῖοντι ἐπ-αῖω, *understand.*
 ξύμπασι ξύμπα, ξύμπασα, ξύμπαν, *all together.*
 15. ἀπειθήσας..... ἀπειθέω, ἀπειθήσω, *be disobedient.*
 ἀτιμάσας ἀτιμάζω, ἀτιμάσω, *esteem lightly.*
 20. τείνει τείνω, τενῶ, ἔτεινα, τέτακα, τέταμαι, ἐτάθην, *stretch, reach, concern.*
 22. σῶμα..... σῶμα, σώματος, τό, *body.*
 διόλλυσιν..... δι-όλλυμι, -ολῶ, -ώλεσα, -ολώλεκα, *destroy;*
 δι-ωλόμην, -όλωλα, and mid. *perish.*
 24. διῴωμεν..... δι-ειμι, *go through.*

7. 25. ἀδίκων ἄδικος, -ον, *wrong*.
 27. ἔπεσθαι ἔπομαι (middle of ἔπω), ἔψομαι, ἐσπόμην, *follow*.
 30. ἀκολουθήσομεν ἀκολουθέω, ἀκολουθήσω, *follow*.
 31. ἐκεῖνο ἐκεῖνος, ἐκεῖνη, ἐκεῖνο, *that*.
 λωβησόμεθα λωβάομαι, λωθήσομαι, *insult, maim, cripple*.
 32. ἀπώλλυτο ἀπ-όλλυμι, -ολῶ, *destroy*.
 8. 1. ὑγιεινοῦ ὑγιεινός, -ή, -όν, *healthy*.
 2. νοσώδους νοσώδης, -ες, *unhealthy, causing ill-health*.
 4. βιωτόν βιωτός, -ή, -όν, *worth living*.
 7. μοχθηροῦ μοχθηρός, -ά, -όν, *wretched, feeble*.
 11. ὀνίνησιν ὀνίνημι, ὀνήσω, ὠνησα, ὠνήθην, *profit*.
 12. φαυλότερον comp. of φαῦλος, -η, -ον, *mean, worthless*.
 14. δικαιοσύνη δικαιοσύνη, -ης, ἡ, *righteousness*.
 15. οὐδαμῶς adv., *by no means*.
 16. τιμιώτερον comp. of τίμιος, -α, -ον, *honourable*.
 18. φροντιστέον *one must take care, verbal adj. of φροντίζω*.
 20. ἀλήθεια ἀλήθεια, -ας, ἡ, *truth*.
 21. ὀρθῶς adv., *rightly*.
 εἰσηγεῖ εἰσ-ηγέομαι, -ηγήσομαι, *bring forward*.
 23. ἐναντίων ἐναντίος, -α, -ον, *opposite, reverse*.
 25. ἀποκτινύναι ἀπο-κτίννυμι, form of ἀποκτείνω, *kill*.
 27. θαυμάσιε θαυμάσιος, -α, -ον, *wonderful, excellent*.
 28. διεληλύθαμεν δι-έρχομαι, (-ελεύσομαι), -ῆλθον, -ελήλυθα, *go through*.
 ὅμοιος ὅμοιος, -α, -ον, *like*.
 29. μένει μένω, μενῶ, ἔμεινα, μεμένηκα, *remain, hold good*.
 30. ζῆν ζάω, ζήσω, *live*.
 9. 1. ὁμολογουμένων ὁμολογέω, ὁμολογήσω, *agree, allow, admit*.
 2. σκεπτέον *one must consider, verbal adj. of σκέπτομαι*.
 πειράσθαι πειράομαι, πειράσομαι, *try*.
 3. ἐξιέναι ἔξ-εἰμι, *go out, escape*.
 ἀφιέντων ἀφ-ίημι, -ήσω, -ῆκα, -εῖκα, -εῖμαι, -είθην, *allow, permit*.
 5. σκέψεις σκέψις, -ews, ἡ, *consideration, question*.
 ἀναλώσεως ἀνάλωσις, -ews, ἡ, *expenditure*.
 6. τροφῆς τροφή, -ῆς, ἡ, *maintenance, bringing up*.
 7. σκέμματα σκέμμα, -ματος, τό, *question*.
 8. ἀναβιωσκομένων ἀναβιώσκομαι, *bring back to life*.
 11. τελούντες τελέω, τελῶ, ἐτέλεσα, *pay*.
 12. ἐξάξουσιν ἐξ-άγω, -άξω, -ήγαγον, -ῆχα, -ῆγμαι, -ήχθην, *lead out*.
 χάριτας χάρις, χάριτος, ἡ, *favour, thanks, gratitude*.
 15. ὑπολογίζεσθαι ὑπο-λογίζομαι, -λογιοῦμαι, *take into account*.
 16. παραμένοντας παρα-μένω, -μενῶ, πορ-έμεινα, παρα-μεμένηκα, *stay beside, remain*.
 ἡσυχίαν ἡσυχία, -ας, ἡ, *quiet*.
 17. ὅτιοῦν ὅστισοῦν, ἡτισοῦν, ὅτιοῦν, *whosoever, what-soever*.

9. 17. πάσχειν πάσχω, πείσομαι, ἔπαθον, πέπονθα, *suffer*.
 19. δρῶμεν δράω, δράσω, ἔδρασα, δέδρακα, δέδραμαι, *do*.
 20. πῃ adv., *at any point*.
 21. ἀντιλέγειν ἀντι-λέγω, -λέξω, *speak against, contradict*.
 22. παῦσαι παύω, παύσω, *make to cease, stop*.
 μακάριε μακάριος, -α, -ον, *excellent*.
 23. ἀκόντων ἄκων, ἄκουσα, ἄκον, *against one's will*.
 26. ἀρχήν ἀρχή, -ῆς, ἡ, *beginning, outset*.
 ἱκανῶς adv., *sufficiently*.
 27. ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπο-κρίνω, -κρινῶ, ἀπ-έκρινα, ἀπο-κέκρικα,
 -κέκριμαι, ἀπ-εκρίθην; *mid. answer*.
 ἐρωτώμενον ἐρωτάω, ἐρωτήσω, *ask (a question)*.
 10. 1. ἐκόντας ἐκόν, ἐκούσα, ἐκόν, *willing*.
 ἀδικητέον *one must do wrong, verbal adj. of ἀδικέω*.
 5. πᾶσαι πᾶς, πᾶσα, πᾶν, *all*.
 ὁμολογίαι ὁμολογία, -ας, ἡ, *conclusion*.
 6. ὀλίγαις ὀλίγος, -η, -ον, *few*.
 ἐκκεχυμένα ἐκ-χέω, -χέω, ἐξ-έχεα, ἐκ-κέχυκα, -κέχυμαι,
 ἐξ-εχύθην, *pour out, squander*.
 7. τηλικοῖδε τηλικόσδε, -ήδε, -όνδε, *so old*.
 γέροντες γέρων, γέροντος, ὁ, *old man*.
 8. σπουδῇ σπουδή, -ῆς, ἡ, *earnestness*.
 διαλεγόμενοι δια-λέγομαι, -λέξομαι, *converse, talk with*.
 ἐλάθομεν λανθάνω, λήσω, ἔλαθον, λέληθα, *escape notice*.
 9. διαφέροντες δια-φέρω, δι-οίσω, -ήνεγκα or -ήνεγκον,
 -ενήνοχα, -ενήνεγμαι, -ηνέχθην, *differ*.
 12. πρᾶότερα *comp. of πρᾶος, πραεῖα, πρᾶον, mild*.
 18. ἀνταδικεῖν ἀντ-αδικέω, -αδικήσω, *wrong in return*.
 21. κακουργεῖν κακουργέω, κακουργήσω, *do evil*.
 22. δήπου adv., *doubtless, I suppose*.
 23. ἀντικακουργεῖν ἀντι-κακουργέω, -κακουργήσω, *injure in turn*.
 κακῶς adv., *ill, badly*.
 31. καθομολογῶν καθ-ομολογέω, -ομολογήσω, *agree to*.
 παρά *prep. with accus., contrary to*.
 35. καταφρονεῖν κατα-φρονέω, -φρονήσω, *despise*.
 36. μάλᾳ adv., *very*.
 κοινωνεῖς κοινωνέω, κοινωνήσω, *share an opinion*.
 37. ξυνδοκεῖ ξυνδοκεῖ, *impers., it seems good*.
 ἀρχώμεθα ἀρχω, ἄρξω, ἡρξα, ἡρχα, ἡργμαι, ἡρχθην,
 begin.
 ἐντεῦθεν adv., *hence, thence*.
 38. οὐδέποτε adv., *never*.
 39. ἀμύνεσθαι ἀμύνω, ἀμυνῶ, ἤμυνα, *ward off; mid. avenge oneself*.
 40. ἀντιδρῶντα ἀντι-δράω, -δράσω, *do in return. retaliate*
 ἀφίστασαι ἀφ-ίστημι, ἀπο-στήσω, ἀπ-έστησα and (in-
 trans.) -έστην, ἀφ-έστηκα (intrans.),
 -έσταμαι, ἀπ-εστάθην, *stand aloof from, dissent from*.

10. 42. δίδασκε διδάσκω, διδάξω, ἐδίδαξα, δεδίδαχα, δεδίδαγμαι, ἐδιδάχθην, *teach*.
43. ἐμμένεις ἐμ-μένω, -μενῶ, *abide by*.
 πρόσθε adv., *before*.
 ἄκουε ἀκούω, ἀκούσομαι, ἤκουσα, ἀκήκοα, ἠκούσθην, *hear*.
45. ἐρωτῶ ἐρωτάω, ἐρωτήσω, *ask*.
47. ἐξαπατητέον *one must deceive*, verbal adj. of ἐξαπατάω.
11. 1. ἄθρει ἀθρέω, ἀθρήσω, *consider*.
 2. πόλιν πόλις, πόλεως, ἡ, *city, state*.
 3. ἥκιστα *worst, least*, superl. adv. of κακός.
 5. ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀπο-κρίνω, mid. *answer*.
 6. ἐννοῶ ἐν-νοέω, ἐν-νοήσω, -ενόησα, *understand*.
 7. ᾧδε adv., *in this way, thus*.
 μέλλουσιν μέλλω, μελλήσω, *intend, be about to*.
 8. ἀποδιδράσκειν ἀπο-διδράσκω, -δράσομαι, ἀπ-έδραν, ἀπο-δέδρακα, *run away*.
 ὀνομάσαι ὀνομάζω, ὀνομάσω, ὠνόμασα, *call*.
 9. νόμοι νόμος, -ου, ὁ, *law*.
 ἐπιστάντες ἐφ-ίστημι, ἐπι-στήσω, *stand by*.
 10. ποιεῖν ποιέω, ποιήσω, *do*.
 11. ἔργῳ ἔργον, -ου, τό, *deed*.
 ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐπι-χειρέω, -χειρήσω, *attempt*.
 διανοεῖ δια-νοέομαι, -νοήσομαι, -νενόημαι, δι-ενοήθην, *intend*.
 12. ἀπολέσαι ἀπ-όλλυμι, -ολῶ, -ώλεσα, -ολώλεκα, *destroy*; -ωλόμην, -όλωλα, *perish*.
 14. ἀνατετράφθαι ἀνα-τρέπω, -τρέψω, ἀν-έτρεψα, ἀνα-τέτροφα and -τέτραφα, -τέτραμμαι, ἀν-ετρέφθην, *overthrow*.
 δίκαι δίκη, -ης, ἡ, *judgment, decision*.
 15. ἰσχύουσιν ἰσχύω, ἰσχύσω, *be strong, have force*.
 ιδιωτῶν ιδιώτης, -ου, ὁ, *private person, individual*.
 ἄκυροι ἄκυρος, -ον, *annulled, set aside*.
 16. διαφθείρονται δια-φθείρω, -φθερῶ, *destroy, render void*.
 18. ῥήτωρ ῥήτωρ, ῥήτορος, ὁ, *orator*.
 19. δικασθείσας δικάζω, δικάσω, ἐδίκασα, *judge, decide*.
 προστάττει προσ-τάττω, -τάξω, -έταξα, -τέταχα, -τέταγμαι, -ετάχθην, *order, ordain*.
 κυρίας κύριος, -α, -ον, *valid*.
 21. ἔκρινε κρίνω, κρίνῶ, ἔκρινα, κέκρικα, κέκριμαι, ἐκρίθην, *judge*.
 12. 4. ἴσως adv., *perhaps*.
 6. εἶωθας εἶωθα as present, εἰώθη, *be accustomed*.
 χρῆσθαι χράομαι, χρήσομαι, ἐχρησάμην, κέχρημαι, ἐχρήσθην, *use*.
 7. ἐγκαλῶν ἐγ-καλέω, -καλῶ, ἐν-εκάλεσα, ἐγ-κέκληκα, -κέκλημαι, ἐν-εκλήθην, *accuse*.
 8. ἐγεννήσαμεν γεννᾶω, γεννήσω, *beget*.

12. 9. ἐλάμβανεν λαμβάνω, λήψομαι, ἔλαβον, εἵληφα, εἵλημαι, ἐλήφθην, *take*.
- μητέρα μητήρ, μητρός, ἡ, *mother*.
10. πατήρ πατήρ, πατρός, ὁ, *father*.
- ἐφύτευσεν φυτεύω, φυτεύσω, *beget*.
- φράσον φράζω, φράσω, *tell*.
11. γάμους γάμος, -ου, ὁ, *marriage*.
- μέμφει μέμφομαι, μέμφομαι, ἐμεμψάμην, ἐμέμφθην, *blame, find fault with*.
13. τροφήν τροφή, -ῆς, ἡ, *nurture*.
- παιδείαν παιδεία, παιδείας, ἡ, *education*.
14. ἐπαιδεύθης παιδεύω, παιδεύσω, *educate*.
15. τεταγμένοι τάσσω, τάξω, ἔταξα, τέταχα, τέταγμαι, ἐτάχθην, *post, appoint, order*.
- παραγγέλλοντες παρ-αγγέλλω, -αγγελῶ, -ήγγειλα, -ήγγελκα, -ήγγεμαι, -ηγγέλθην, *charge, order*.
16. μουσικῇ μουσική, -ῆς, ἡ, *music*.
- γυμναστικῇ γυμναστική, -ῆς, ἡ, *gymnastics*.
18. εἶεν εἶεν, *particle, well, good*.
- ἐξετράφης ἐκ-τρέφω, -θρέψω, ἐξ-έθρεψα, ἐκ-τέτροφα, -τέθραμμαι, ἐξ-ετράφην, *bring up*.
20. ἔκγονος ἔκγονος, ἐκγόνου, ὁ, *offspring*.
- δοῦλος δοῦλος, -ου, ὁ, *slave*.
21. πρόγονοι πρόγονος, -ου, ὁ, *ancestor*.
23. ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἐπι-χειρέω, -ήσω, *try, attempt*.
- ἀντιποιεῖν ἀντι-ποιέω, -ποιήσω, *do in return*.
25. δεσπότην δεσπότης, -ου, ὁ, *master*.
27. ἀντιλέγειν ἀντι-λέγω, -λέξω, *speak against*.
- τυπτόμενον τύπτω, τυπτήσω, ἔτυψα, *strike, beat*.
- ἀντιτύπτειν ἀντι-τύπτω, *strike back*.
28. πατρίδα πατρίς, πατρίδος, ἡ, *country*.
29. ἔξεσται ἔξ-εστι, -εσται, *it is possible*.
32. ἀνταπολλύναι ἀνταπ-όλλυμι, *destroy in return*.
35. σοφός σοφός, -ής, -όν, *wise, clever*.
- λέληθεν λανθάνω, λήσω, ἔλαθον, λέληθα, *escape the notice of*.
37. σεμνότερον σεμνός, -ής, -όν, *august, reverend*.
- ἁγιώτερον ἅγιος, -α, -ον, *holy, sacred*.
38. μοῖρα μοῖρα, -ας, ἡ, *reverence, honour*.
39. σέβεσθαι σέβομαι, *worship, show respect*.
- ὑπείκειν ὑπ-είκω, -είξω, -εἶξα, *yield, submit to*.
40. θωπεύειν θωπεύω, θωπεύσω, *flatter, humour*.
- χαλεπαίνουσιν χαλεπαίνω, χαλεπανῶ, ἐχαλέπηνα, *be angry*.
41. κελεύη κελεύω, κελεύσω, ἐκέλευσα, κεκέλευκα, κε-κέλευσμαι, ἐκελεύσθην, *order*.
42. παθεῖν πάσχω, πείσομαι, ἔπαθον, πέπονθα, *suffer, endure*.
- ἡσυχίαν ἡσυχία, -ας, ἡ, *quiet*.
43. δεῖσθαι δέω, δήσω, ἔδησα, δέδεκα, δέδεμαι, ἐδέσθην, *bind*.

12. 43. πόλεμον πόλεμος, -ου, ὁ, *war*.
 44. τρωθησόμενον τιτρώσκω, τρώσω, ἔτρωσα, τέτρωμαι, ἐτρώθην, *wound*.
 ἀποθανούμενον ἀπο-θνήσκω, -θανοῦμαι, ἀπ-έθανον, ἀπο-τέθνηκα, *die*.
 45. ὑπεικτέον *one must give way*, verbal adj. of ὑπ-είκω.
 ἀναχωρητέον *one must retreat*, verbal adj. of ἀνα-χωρέω.
 46. λειπτέον *one must leave*, verbal adj. of λείπω.
 τάξιν τάξις, τάξεως, ἡ, *rank, line*.
 47. πανταχοῦ *adv., everywhere*.
 49. πέφυκε φύω, φύσω, ἔφυσα or (intrans.) ἔφυν, πέφυκα (intrans.), *plant*; intrans. tenses of active, *be by nature, be*.
 βιάζεσθαι βιάζομαι, βιάσομαι, *constrain, use violence to*.
 ὄσιον ὄσιος, -α, -ον, *pious*.
 50. ἥττον ἥττων, ἥττον, *less*.
 13. 1. τοίνυν *adv., then, therefore*.
 3. δρᾶν δράω, δράσω, ἔδρασα, δέδρακα, δέδραμαι, *do*.
 4. μεταδόντες μετα-δίδωμι, -δώσω, μετ-έδωκα, μετα-δέδωκα, -δέδομαι, μετ-εδόθην, *give a share of*.
 5. ἀπάντων ἅπας, ἅπαντα, ἅπαν, *all*.
 6. προαγορεύομεν προ-αγορεύω, -αγορεύσω, *proclaim*.
 ἐξουσίαν ἐξουσία, -ας, ἡ, *power*.
 8. δοκιμασθῆ δοκιμάζω, δοκιμάσω, *examine*; pass. *come of age*.
 9. ἀρέσκωμεν ἀρέσκω, ἀρέσω, ἤρεσα, ἠρέσθην, *please*.
 11. ἐμποδῶν *adv., in the way*.
 ἀπαγορεύει ἀπ-αγορεύω, -αγορεύσω, *forbid*.
 12. ἀποικίαν ἀποικία, -ας; ἡ, *colony*.
 ἵεναι εἶμι, *go*.
 13. μετοικεῖν μετοικέω, μετοικήσω, *change one's abode, be an alien*.
 ἄλλοσε *adv., to another place*.
 14. ἐκεῖσε *adv., thither*.
 15. παραμείνῃ παρα-μένω, -μενῶ, παρ-έμεινα, παρα-μεμένηκα, *remain*.
 τρόπον τρόπος, -ου, ὁ, *way, manner*.
 16. διοικοῦμεν δι-οικέω, -οικήσω, δι-ῶκησα, *manage, direct*.
 18. τριχῇ *adv., in three ways*.
 19. γεννητῆϊς γεννήτης, -ου, ὁ, *parent*.
 20. τροφεῦσι τροφεύς, τροφέως; ὁ, *one who brings up*.
 22. προτιθέντων προ-τίθημι, -θήσω, προῦθηκα, προ-τέθηκα, -τέθειμαι, προὔτεθην, *place before, propose*.
 ἀγρίως *adv. of ἄγριος, savage*.
 ἐπιταττόντων ἐπι-τάττω, -τάξω, *order*.
 23. ἐφιέντων ἐφ-ίημι, -ήσω, -ῆκα, -εῖκα, -εῖμαι, -εῖθην, *send to, allow*.
 δυοῖν δύο, δυοῖ, *two*.
 24. οὐδέτερα οὐδέτερος, -α, -ον, *neither of the two*.
 14. 2. αἰτίαι αἰτία, αἰτίας, ἡ, *cause, charge*.

14. 2. ἐνέξεσθαι ἐν-έχω, -έξω or -σχήσω, mid. *be held, be amenable, be chargeable.*
 ἐπινοεῖς..... ἐπι-νοέω, -νοήσω, *propose.*
 3. ἥκιστα least, superl. adv. of comp. ἥσων.
 4. ἴσως adv., *perhaps.*
 καθάπτουσιντο καθ-άπτω, -άψω, -ῆψα, mid. *lay hold of, attack.*
 6. ὁμολογίαν..... ὁμολογία, -as, ἡ, *agreement.*
 7. τεκμήρια τεκμήριον, -ου, τό, *proof.*
 9. διαφερόντως adv., *differently from, more than.*
 10. ἐπεδήμεις ἐπι-δημέω, -δημήσω, *stay at, live.*
 11. θεωρίαν θεωρία, -as, ἡ, *looking at, festival.*
 12. ἅπαξ adv., *once.*
 οὐδαμόσε adv., *to no place.*
 στρατευσόμενος στρατεύομαι, στρατεύσομαι, ἐστρατευσάμην, *take the field.*
 13. ἀποδημίαν..... ἀποδημία, -as, ἡ, *a going abroad.*
 14. ἐπιθυμία ἐπιθυμία, -as, ἡ, *desire.*
 15. εἰδέναι οἶδα, εἶσομαι, *know.*
 17. ἡροῦ αἰρέω, αἰρήσω, εἶλον, ἤρηκα, ἤρημαι, ἤρέθην, *take; mid. choose.*
 πολιτεύσεσθαι πολιτεύομαι, πολιτεύσομαι, ἐπολιτευσάμην, *live in a state.*
 20. φυγῆς φυγή, -ῆς, ἡ, *flight, exile.*
 τιμήσασθαι τιμάω, τιμήσω, *honour, value; mid. assess the punishment at.*
 23. ἐκαλλωπίζου..... καλλωπίζω, καλλωπιῶ, *embellish; mid. make a display.*
 ἀγανακτῶν ἀγανακτέω, ἀγανακτήσω, *be vexed, displeased.*
 τεθνάναι θνήσκω, θανοῦμαι, τέθνηκα, ἔθανον, *die.*
 25. αἰσχύνει αἰσχύνω, αἰσχυνῶ, ἥσχυνα, ἥσχύνθην, *disgrace; pass. be ashamed at.*
 26. ἐντρέπει ἐν-τρέπω, -τρέψω, *turn about; mid. and pass. have respect for.*
 27. φαυλότατος superl. of φαῦλος, -η, -ον, *worthless.*
 ἀποδιδράσκειν ἀπο-διδράσκω, -δράσομαι, -δέδρακα, ἀπ-έδραν, *run away.*
 28. ξυνθήκας ξυνθήκη, -ης, ἡ, *covenant.*
 29. ξυνέθου ξυν-τίθημι, -θήσω, -έθηκα, -τέθηκα, -τέθειμαι, -ετέθην, *place together; mid. agree.*
 30. φάσκοντες φάσκω, *say.*
 36. παραβαίνεις παρα-βαίνω, -βήσομαι, παρ-έβην, παρα-βέβηκα, -βέβαμαι, *transgress, break.*
 37. ἀπατηθεῖς..... ἀπατάω, ἀπατήσω, *deceive, take in.*
 38. χρόνῳ χρόνος, -ου, ὁ, *time.*
 ἔτεσιν ἔτος, ἔτους, τό, *year.*
 39. ἑβδομήκοντα..... numeral adj., *seventy.*
 41. προηροῦ προ-αἰρέω, -αἰρήσω, *take away before; mid. prefer.*

14. 42. εὐνομεῖσθαι εὐνομέομαι, *be well governed.*
43. βαρβαρικῶν βαρβαρικός, -ή, -όν, *foreign.*
ἐλάττω ἐλάττων, -ον, *less, comp. of μικρός.*
44. ἀπεδήμησας ἀπο-δημέω, -δημήσω, *be away.*
χωλοί χωλός, -ή, -όν, *lame.*
τυφλοί τυφλός, -ή, -όν, *blind.*
45. ἀνάπηροι ἀνάπηρος, -α, -ον, *crippled.*
47. ἄνευ prep., *without.*
48. ἐμμενεῖς ἐμ-μένω, -μενῶ, *abide by.*
49. καταγέλαστος καταγέλαστος, -ον, *ridiculous.*
15. 1. ἐξαμαρτάνων ἐξ-αμαρτάνω, -αμαρτήσομαι, -ήμαρτον, -ημάρτ-
ηκα, *sin.*
2. ἐπιτηδείους ἐπιτήδειος, -ου, ὁ, *friend.*
4. στερηθῆναι στερέω, στερήσω, ἐστέρησα, ἐστέρηκα, ἐστέρ-
ημαι, ἐστερήθην, *deprive.*
6. ἐγγύτατα superl. of adv., ἐγγύς, *near.*
7. ἀμφοτέραι ἀμφοτέρος, -α, -ον, *both.*
8. πολέμιος πολέμιος, -α, -ον, *hostile.*
πολιτεία πολιτεία, -ας, ἡ, *constitution.*
9. κήδονται κήδω, κηδήσω, pass. *be anxious for, devoted to.*
ὑποβλέψονται ὑπο-βλέπω, -βλέψομαι, *look askance at.*
10. διαφθορέα διαφθορεύς, -έως, ὁ, *subverter.*
ἡγούμενοι ἡγέομαι, ἡγήσομαι, ἡγησάμην, ἡγήμαι, *suppose, consider.*
- βεβαιώσεις ... βεβαιώω, βεβαιώσω, *make firm, confirm.*
11. δικασταῖς δικαστής, -οῦ, ὁ, *juror, judge.*
δόξαν δόξα, -ης, ἡ, *opinion.*
ὀρθῶς adv., *rightly.*
12. σφόδρα adv., *certainly.*
13. νέων νέος, -α, -ον, *young.*
ἀνοήτων ἀνόητος, -ον, *foolish.*
14. φεύξει φεύγω, φεύξομαι and φευξοῦμαι, ἔφυγον, πέ-
φευγα, *flee.*
15. κόσμιωτάτους superl. of κόσμιος, -α, -ον, *orderly.*
16. πλησιάσεις πλησιάζω, πλησιάσω, *approach.*
17. ἀναισχυντήσεις ἀναισχυντέω, ἀναισχυντήσω, *be shameless.*
διαλεγόμενος δια-λέγομαι, δια-λέξομαι, *converse, argue.*
18. ἀρετή ἀρετή, -ῆς, ἡ, *virtue.*
19. δικαιοσύνη δικαιοσύνη, -ης, ἡ, *justice.*
20. νόμιμα νόμιμα, -ων, τά, *usages, customs.*
ἄσχημον ἄσχήμων, ἄσχημον, *unseemly, shameful.*
22. τόπων τόπος, -ου, ὁ, *place.*
ἀπαρεῖς ἀπ-αίρω, -αρῶ, -ῆρα, *set out, depart.*
24. ἀταξία ἀταξία, -ας, ἡ, *disorder.*
ἀκολασία ἀκολασία, -ας, ἡ, *licence.*
25. ἀκούοιεν ἀκούω, ἀκούσομαι, ἤκουσα, ἀκήκοα, ἠκούσθην, *hear.*
γελοῖως adv., *ridiculously.*
26. σκευήν σκευή, -ῆς, ἡ, *dress.*

15. 26. περιθέμενος περι-τίθημι, -θήσω, *put on*.
 διφθέραν διφθέρα, -ας, ἥ, *leather, coat of skins*.
27. ἐνσκευάζεσθαι ἐν-σκευάζω, -σκευάσω, *prepare; mid. put on*.
28. σχῆμα σχῆμα, -ματος, τό, *appearance*.
 μεταλλάξας μετ-αλλάσσω, -αλλάξω, -ήλλαξα, *change, alter*.
29. γέρων γέρων, γέροντος, ὁ, *old man*.
30. ἐτόλμησας τολμάω, τολμήσω, *dare*.
 ἐπιθυμῆν ἐπι-θυμέω, -θυμήσω, *desire, covet*.
33. ἀνάξια ἀνάξιος, -ον, *unworthy*.
 ὑπερχόμενος ὑπ-έρχομαι, ὑπ-ῆλθον, *go under, cringe to*.
 βιώσει βιώω, βιώσομαι, *live*.
34. δουλεύων δουλεύω, δουλεύσω, *be a slave*.
 εὐωχούμενος εὐ-ωχέω, -ωχήσω, *entertain well, feast*.
35. δεῖπνον δεῖπνον, -ον, τό, *dinner*.
38. βούλει βούλομαι, βουλήσομαι, βεβούλημαι, ἐβουλήθην, *wish*.
40. ἀπολαύσωσιν ἀπο-λαύω, -λαύσομαι, ἀπ-έλαυσα, *enjoy*.
42. ξυνόντος ξύν-εἰμι, -έσομαι, *be with*.
45. ὕφελος ὕφελος, -ους, τό, *advantage, profit*.
16. 3. "Αἰδου..... "Αιδης, -ου, ὁ, *Hades*.
 4. ἀπολογήσασθαι ἀπο-λογέομαι, -λογήσομαι, *speak in defence*.
 ἐκεῖ adv., *there*.
 5. ἄμεινον ἀμείνων, -ον, *better, comp. of ἀγαθός*.
 6. ὁσιώτερον comp. of ὅσιος, -α, -ον, *holy*.
10. ἀνταδικήσας ἀντ-αδικέω, -αδικήσω, *wrong in return*.
 ἀντικακουργήσας ἀντι-κακουργέω, -κακουργήσω, *injure in turn*.
13. πατρίδα πατρίς, πατρίδος, ἡ, *country*.
15. εὐμενῶς adv., *graciously*.
 ὑποδέχονται ὑπο-δέχομαι, -δέξομαι, *receive under one's roof, welcome*.
17. 1. ἐταῖρε..... ἐταῖρος, -ου, ὁ, *friend*.
 2. κορυβαντιῶντες κορυβαντιάω, -άσω, *celebrate the rites of the Corybantes*.
 αὐλῶν αὐλός, -οῦ, ὁ, *flute*.
 3. ἡχή ἡχή, ἡχῆς, ἡ, *sound*.
 4. βομβεῖ βομβέω, βομβήσω, *hum, ring*.
 6. μάτην adv., *in vain*.
 9. ἔα exclamation, *ha!*
 10. ὑφηγεῖται ὑφ-ηγέομαι, -ηγήσομαι, *guide, lead the way*.

ή κεντός, (Cup), least.

χαλεπαίνω, ἀπὸ - ἰβανίζω.

PLATO : CRITO.

A TRANSLATION.

1. SOCRATES. Why have you come at this hour, Crito ? Surely it is still early ?

CRITO. Quite early.

Soc. About what time ?

CR. Just before daybreak.

Soc. I wonder how it was that the warder consented to let you in.

CR. He knows me, Socrates, I come here so often, and besides he is under some obligation to me.

Soc. Have you only just come, or have you been here long ?

CR. Some time.

Soc. Then why did you sit by me in silence, and not wake me at once ?

CR. Believe me, Socrates, I could wish that I myself were not so sleepless and so sorrowful. And besides I have long been wondering to see how sweetly you sleep ; and I purposely did not wake you, that you might spend your time as happily as you could. Indeed, often before all through your life I thought you had a happy disposition, but never so much as now when this trouble has come to you, seeing how easily and calmly you bear it.

Soc. It would indeed be unreasonable, Crito, to complain now, at my time of life, of having to die.

CR. Others besides yourself, Socrates, are overtaken by similar misfortunes at the same time of life, but their age does not prevent them from complaining of what has befallen them.

Soc. That is true. But, tell me, why have you come so early?

CR. To bring you some news, Socrates. It is not, I suppose, bad news to you, but bad and painful news to me and to all your friends; and I think I shall find it as hard to bear as any of them.

Soc. What is it? Has the ship arrived from Delos, on the coming of which I must die?

CR. No, it has not actually come; but I think it will come to-day, judging by what some people tell me who have arrived from Sunium and left it there. It is clear from their news that it will come to-day; and then to-morrow, Socrates, you will have to end your life.

2. Soc. Well, Crito, may it end happily! If the gods will have it so, so let it be. But I do not think that the ship will come to-day.

CR. Why do you suppose that?

Soc. I will tell you. I suppose I must die on the day after that on which the ship arrives.

CR. So, at least, they say who have the power to decide.

Soc. Then I do not think it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I infer that from a dream I saw a little earlier in the night, and it is possible you did well not to wake me.

CR. And what was the dream?

Soc. A fair and beautiful woman, robed in white, seemed to come to me and call me, and say, "Socrates,

'The third day shalt thou come to fruitful Phthia.' "

CR. It was an absurd dream, Socrates.

Soc. No, Crito, for my own part I think the meaning was clear.

3. CR. Only too clear, it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now take my advice, and save yourself. For if you die, it is not one misfortune that will befall me; for, apart from losing such a friend as I shall never find again, many people, who are not well acquainted with you and me, will think that, although I could have saved you, had I been willing to spend money, I did not do so. And what worse reproach can a man incur than this, that he should be thought to value his money more than his friends? For people will not believe that, though we

were anxious to save you, it was you yourself who would not leave this place.

Soc. But why, my good Crito, do we care so much about what people think? The best of them, who are most worth considering, will think that things went pretty much as they have gone.

CR. But you must see, Socrates, that we have to care too for what people in general think. The present state of affairs makes it plain that, if a man be falsely accused before the people, they can do him not the least, but almost the greatest harm possible.

Soc. I wish it had been in the power of the people to do the greatest harm, that they also might have been able to do the greatest good, and it would have been well. But as it is, they can do neither. For they can neither act wisely nor foolishly, but do to you whatever comes to hand.

4. CR. Well, it probably is so. But tell me this, Socrates: are you really anxious on my behalf, and on behalf of your other friends, for fear that, if you escaped from here, informers might give us trouble, because we smuggled you out, and we might be compelled perhaps to lose all our property, or at least large sums of money, or perhaps to suffer some other inconvenience besides? If it is something of this kind that you fear, dismiss it from your mind. For I suppose that in saving you we ought to run this risk, and if necessary greater risks than this. But take my advice, Socrates, and do not say no.

Soc. I am anxious, Crito, about that, and about much else besides.

CR. Do not be afraid on that account. For indeed the sum of money which certain people would be ready to take to get you safely out of this place is quite small. Then you must know how cheap these informers can be bought, and not much money would be required for them. My money is at your disposal, and I fancy it will be enough; besides, if from any wish to spare me you thought it wrong to spend my money, here are citizens of other states ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has actually brought enough money for this very purpose. Cebes, too, and a host of others are ready to come forward.

So, as I said, do not because of any such fears shrink from seeking safety; and do not, as you said in court, let it be a difficulty to you, that you will have nothing to do with yourself if you get out. For there are many places besides Athens where you might go, and find friends. If you wish to go to Thessaly I have friends there, who will esteem you highly, and provide for your safety, so that no one in Thessaly will be able to annoy you.

5. Besides, Socrates, I think you are trying to do a wrong thing in throwing away your life, when you might save it; and you are trying to bring upon yourself the same fate which your enemies would try to bring, and did try to bring, when they sought to destroy you. In addition to that, I think you are betraying your sons, whom you will be abandoning, when you might have finished their bringing up and education. As far as you are concerned, they will be at the mercy of chance. They will naturally have the usual experience of orphans when left under guardians. For a man either ought not to beget children, or, if he does, he ought also to take all the trouble of bringing them up and educating them. You seem to me to be choosing the least strenuous course. But your choice should be the choice of a strong and brave man, more especially when you assert that throughout your life you have busied yourself with virtue.

Thus it is that I feel shame, both for you and for us your friends, for it may seem that everything that has happened to you has been, to a certain degree, the result of our cowardice. I mean the fact that the case came on in court unnecessarily, and the very course which the action took, and this final catastrophe—which has reduced the whole affair to a farce—I mean your seeming to have slipped through our hands through some baseness and cowardice on our part, inasmuch as we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, though it is simple and possible, even though little enough help was to be had from us. Be careful, Socrates, that all this may not prove disgraceful, as well as unfortunate, both for you and for us. Think it over, or rather the time for thinking is past and the time for decision come. There is only one course. For everything must be done to-night. If we

wait at all, it will be impossible, and the chance will be lost. Take my advice, Socrates, I beseech you, and do not refuse.

6. Soc. My dear Crito, your enthusiasm is most valuable, should it prove to have any right on its side. If not, the greater it is the more dangerous it is. We must therefore consider whether we ought to do this or not. For not only now, but always, I have been one who, of all guides that I might have, followed none but reasoning, which, when I think, seems to me the best counsellor. The conclusions I arrived at before I cannot now cast away merely because this chance has befallen me; they seem to me pretty much what they were. Those which before I respected and honoured I still respect and honour; and if we cannot now produce any better, you may be sure I will never agree with you, no, not even if the power of the multitude were to try and scare me, as children are scared with bogies, by bringing upon me more imprisonments and deaths and fines than are here already.

How then can we best make our enquiry? Suppose we first take up your statement about people's opinions, and consider whether we were always right or not in alleging that some opinions were to be respected, and some not; or if before I had to die the argument held good, but it has become apparent that it was merely brought forward for the sake of argument, and was in reality child's play and nonsense; for I am anxious with your help, Crito, to inquire whether it will seem to me, in my present position, at all changed, or the same as before, and whether we are to dismiss it or listen to it. It was stated, I think, on each occasion by people, who imagined that they were talking sense, that, as I said just now, some of the opinions men form we must value, others not. Now tell me, Crito, do you not think we were right? In all human probability you are not in the case of having to die to-morrow, and the present state of affairs will not influence you. Consider then. Do you not think that we had sufficient grounds for saying that we ought not to respect all the opinions held by men, but only some and not others, and not the opinions of all men, but only of some and not of others? What do you say? Were we not right in saying so?

CR. We were right.

Soc. Then we should respect the good opinions and not the bad?

CR. Yes.

Soc. And are not the good opinions the opinions of the wise, and the bad the opinions of the foolish?

CR. Certainly.

7. Soc. Well, consider whether we were equally right in the following points. Does a man, who is taking a course of gymnastic training, and making that his business, pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of everyone, or of only the person who happens to be his physician or trainer?

CR. Of one man only.

Soc. Then he ought to fear the blame, and welcome the praise, of that one man only and not of the many?

CR. Clearly.

Soc. Then he should work and exercise and moreover eat and drink in the way that that one man, his master, who has experience, approves, and not in the way that everyone else approves?

CR. That is so.

Soc. Good. Now if he does not listen to the one, and does not respect his opinion and his praise, but respects what the inexperienced many say, will he come to no harm?

CR. Certainly he will.

Soc. And what will this harm be? and what will it concern, and what part of the man who will not listen will it affect?

CR. His body clearly, for that is what it is injuring.

Soc. You are right. Then in other cases, Crito, not to go through them all, is it not the same? And, in fine, where it is a question of what is right and wrong, noble and base, good and bad—and it is about this that we have now to think—ought we to follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one man who understands, if there be any such, and who ought to make us feel more shame and fear than everyone else put together? If we do not follow his advice, we shall spoil and cripple that part which we used to say right improves and wrong destroys. Or is it not so?

CR. No, it is so, Socrates.

8. Soc. Again, if by respecting some opinion other than that of those who understand we destroy that part of us which is improved by what is healthy, and injured by what is unhealthy, is it worth while to go on living when it has been maimed? The part in question is the body, is it not?

CR. It is.

Soc. Then is it worth while to live with a feeble and maimed body?

CR. Certainly not.

Soc. But is it worth while to live, when that part of us has been maimed which is ruined by what is wrong and profited by what is right? Do we consider that part, whichever of our parts it is, which is concerned with right and wrong as such, less worthy than our body?

CR. Certainly not.

Soc. More valuable then?

CR. Yes, far more so.

Soc. Then, my friend, we shall not require to be so deeply anxious as to what the many will say of us, but rather think of what the one man who understands about right and wrong, and what Truth herself, will say. So in the first place you were not right in bringing forward the argument, that we ought to care for the opinion of the many as to what is right, noble, good, and the reverse. But it might be said, you know, the many can kill us.

CR. That, too, is clear; it might be said, Socrates.

Soc. You are right; but, my excellent sir, this reasoning which we have been through seems to me to be still like what it was before. And consider if another of our conclusions still holds good or not—that it is not living that is to be most esteemed, but living well.

CR. It does hold good.

Soc. Does it still hold good or not, that living well and nobly and rightly are all the same thing?

CR. It does hold good.

9. Soc. Then starting from these premises on which we are agreed, we have now to consider whether it is right or wrong for me to try and escape from here without the

leave of the Athenians. If it seems right, let us attempt it; if not, let us leave it alone. As to the questions you suggest, questions of expense, of reputation, and of bringing up children, I am afraid these are what would be asked by our friends the multitude, who lightly kill, and, if they could, would with as little thought make alive. For us, I think, since our reasoning leads us to that conclusion, the only question is, that which we spoke of just now, whether we should be doing right in paying money and incurring obligations to those who are to get me out of this place, and whether you would be right in contriving my escape, and I in escaping, or if we should in fact be acting wrongly in doing all this. If it appears that to do it would be to do wrong, I am afraid we must not take into account the fact of my having to die if I stay here and take no action, or of my having to suffer any other evil fate rather than the fact that we should be doing wrong.

CR. I fancy you are right, Socrates. But think, what are we to do?

Soc. Let us examine the question, my good friend, together, and if at any point in my argument you can contradict me, do so and I will agree. But if not, from henceforth, my excellent sir, you must stop saying the same thing to me so often, that I ought to go away from here without the permission of the Athenians. For I hold it most important to persuade you to take this line, but I would not force you. Consider therefore whether you think the premises of our discussion sufficiently established, and try and answer my questions as you think best.

CR. I will try.

10. Soc. Do we admit that we ought in no way to do wrong purposely, or may we do wrong in some ways and not in others? Is wrong-doing under no circumstances good or noble, as we have often agreed in the past? or have all our previous conclusions gone by the board in these last few days? and formerly, Crito, when we, old men as we were, discussed things seriously together, were we without knowing it no better than children? Or is it beyond all doubt the case, as we then said it

was, whether the multitude agree or not, and whether we have to endure misfortunes yet more grievous than these or less grievous, that still wrong-doing as such is both bad and shameful to the doer under all circumstances? Do we admit it or not?

CR. We do.

Soc. Then under no circumstances should we do wrong?

CR. Certainly not.

Soc. Then, not even when a man has suffered wrong, should he pay it back, as the multitude believe, that is, if we should under no circumstances do wrong?

CR. Apparently not.

Soc. Again, ought we injure anyone, Crito, or not?

CR. Certainly not, Socrates.

Soc. What then? When injury has been done to a man, is it right for him to retaliate, as the multitude say, or wrong?

CR. It is never right.

Soc. For, I suppose, to injure men is just the same as doing wrong?

CR. What you say is true.

Soc. Then one must not retaliate, or injure any man, no matter what one has suffered at the hands of men. And be sure, Crito, that if you agree to this, you do not do so against your judgment, for I know that only a very few people believe it and will believe it. Those who have accepted the belief, and those who have not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily look on each other's conclusions with contempt. Therefore do you, too, consider very carefully whether you share my opinion and believe this as I do; and let us start our discussion by assuming that it is never right either to do wrong, or to pay back wrong with wrong, or when a man suffers an injury to avenge himself by inflicting an injury in return. Or do you dissent from me and not admit the premise? For my own part I have long believed it, and still believe it. But if you have come to some other conclusion, say so, and tell me what it is; or if you still abide by our former opinion, hear what follows.

CR. I do abide by it, and I believe as you do. Go on.

Soc. Then I will make the statement, or rather ask the

question, that comes next. If you make a just agreement with any one, ought you to perform it or to play him false?

CR. You ought to perform it.

11. Soc. See what follows on this. If I go away from here without obtaining leave from the state, am I doing harm to anyone, and, more than that, to those whom particularly I ought not to injure, or am I not? Am I abiding by the just agreement I made, or am I not?

CR. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

Soc. Look at it from this point of view. If when I was going to abscond, or whatever we are to call it, the laws and the commonwealth of Athens were to come and appear to me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what is it that you are intending to do? Is it not true that by what you are attempting you propose to destroy us, the laws, and the whole state as well, as far as you can do it? Can you conceive a state as still in existence and not overthrown, where decisions at law have no force, but are disregarded and rendered void by individuals?" What shall we say, Crito, to this and other like arguments? For anyone, more especially an orator, would have much to say on behalf of this law which is endangered, the law that ordains that decisions in the courts shall hold good. Are we to say in reply that the city in my case was in the wrong, and did not give the proper verdict? Is that what we are to say, or what?

CR. That, Socrates, by all means.

12. Soc. But what if the laws were to say, "Socrates, was that what you and we agreed, or was it to abide by all judgments which the state might give?" If then we expressed surprise at their words, perhaps they would say, "Do not be surprised, Socrates, at what we say, but answer, since you yourself are wont to make use of question and answer. To begin with, what fault have you to find with us and with the state, that you attempt to destroy us? Were we not in the first place responsible for your birth, and was it not by our means that your father took your mother to wife and begot you? Tell us, then, have you

any fault to find with the character of such of us as are marriage-laws?" "I have none," I should say.

"But perhaps you have in the case of the laws which concern the nurture and education of a child when it is born, for that education you as well as others received? Were such of us laws as are in charge of that ordaining wrongly when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastic?" "You were right," I should say. "Well, when you were born and brought up and educated, could you, in the first place, say that you were not our offspring and our slave, both you and your fathers before you? And if that is so, do you fancy that what is right for us is equally right for you, and that, if we try to do anything to you, it is right for you to do the same by us? Or are we to believe that in dealing with your father, or your master, if you had had one, you would not have enjoyed equality of rights, so as to do as you had been done by, and answer reproof with reproof, and blow with blow, and the like in many similar cases, yet that in dealing with your country and the laws, you may do so, with the result that if we try to destroy you, in the belief that it is right, you will endeavour to the best of your power to have your revenge by destroying us, the laws and your country, and you will say that in doing so you are acting rightly, you, the man so truly interested in virtue?"

"Or are you so clever that you have forgotten that your country is a more precious, reverend, and holy thing, and is held in greater honour by the gods, and by reasonable men, than mother and father and all other forebears, and that you ought to show more respect, and be more ready to make concessions and humour an angry country than an angry father, and that you ought either convince her or do what she tells you, and endure quietly whatever she bids you endure, whether it be stripes or imprisonment, and that if she sends you forth to war, to be wounded or killed, you must go, for that is right, and you must not flinch or draw back or leave the ranks, but in war and in the courts alike, and everywhere, you must do what the city, your country, tells you, or if not convince her as to what is right? To use violence to a mother or a father is impious,

and it is far more impious to use it towards your country." What shall we say to this, Crito? Shall we say that the laws are speaking the truth or not?

CR. I think they are.

13. Soc. "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws might perhaps say, "whether we are right in asserting that your present attempt is an attempt to treat us wrongfully. For though we brought you into the world, reared you, educated you, and gave to you and to all the other citizens a share in all the good things we could, yet inasmuch as we have given freedom of choice to any and every Athenian when he has come of age and seen the administration of the city and us the laws, we proclaim that any one whom we do not please may take his property and go wherever he likes. No one of us laws stands in his way or forbids any one of you who likes to go to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and the city; or if he wishes to go and live elsewhere, we allow him to go wherever he pleases, taking his property with him.

"But if any one of you remains, his eyes being open to the way in which we decide cases and carry on the rest of the public administration, we then affirm that he has practically entered into an agreement with us to do what we tell him; and the man who does not obey us we say does wrong in three ways, first because he does not obey us who are his parents, and secondly because he does not obey us who brought him up, and thirdly because having agreed to obey us he neither obeys us nor convinces us, if we in any case go wrong, though we give him the choice, and do not savagely order him to do what we tell him; but when we allow him one of two alternatives, either to convince us or to obey, he does neither.

14. "These are the charges, we assert, Socrates, to which you also will be open if you do what you propose, and not less open than other Athenians, but more than almost any one." If then I said, "Why so?" they might justly upbraid me, saying that it is because I have entered into this agreement with them more fully than most Athenians. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong proofs of the fact that we and the city satisfied you. For you would never have

lived in the city more than all the other Athenians, unless it had pleased you better. You never left the city to be present at a festival (except once to see the Isthmian Games), or to go anywhere else, unless it were on a campaign, nor did you ever go on other journeys like other men, nor feel a desire to become acquainted with another city or other laws, but we and our city were sufficient for you. So fully did you choose us, and agree to live your life under our guidance; and in particular you begot children here, as if the city satisfied you.

“Moreover, in the trial itself you might have suggested exile as a punishment if you had wished, and then have done with permission from the city what you are now attempting to do without permission. On that occasion you made a display of not caring whether you had to die, but, as you said, preferred death to exile. Now these words make you feel no shame, nor have you any respect for us, the laws—for you are trying to destroy us—but you act as a worthless slave would act, and try to abscond regardless of the covenants and agreements under which you agreed with us to live your life as a citizen. Now first answer this question: are we right when we say that your agreement to live according to us was a reality and not a pretence, or are we not?” What are we to say to this, Crito? Can we do anything but agree?

CR. We must agree, Socrates.

Soc. Then would they not say, “You are breaking the covenants and agreements you made with us. You were not forced to make them, or deceived, or compelled to decide at short notice; but you had seventy years in which to go away, if we did not please you, and the agreement seemed to you unfair. You showed no preference for Sparta or Crete, which you always say are well governed, nor for any other city, Greek or foreign, but you were less away from the city than the lame and the blind and the rest who are crippled. So you were more fully satisfied than the rest of the Athenians with the city and with us the laws, that is clear; for who would be satisfied with a city that had no laws? Now will you not abide by your agreements? You will, if you take our advice,

Socrates ; and so you will avoid making yourself ridiculous by leaving the city.

15. "For indeed consider, if you commit this transgression and are guilty of any of these sins, what good you will do to yourself or your friends. For it is pretty clear that your friends will run the risk of being banished and deprived of their citizenship themselves, or of losing their property. And as for yourself, in the first place, if you go to a neighbouring city, Thebes or Megara—for both are well governed—you will be received as an enemy, Socrates, to their constitutions, and all who are devoted to their own cities will view you with suspicion, considering that you are a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm the opinion the jury had of you, so that it will appear that their verdict was justified. For a man who is a subverter of law would certainly be thought to be a subverter of young and foolish characters. Will you therefore shun well-governed cities and the most law-abiding citizens? If you do, will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them, and feel no shame when you enter into discussions—about what, Socrates? Will you be able to say, as you said here, that for men the most precious things are virtue and justice and institutions and laws? Do you not think that Socrates and his doings will appear monstrous? You ought to think so."

"But will you leave this neighbourhood and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly? For there there is plenty of disorder and licence, and perhaps they would be glad to listen to you when you described in what a ridiculous fashion you escaped from the prison, putting on some disguise—a peasant's coat of skins, or some other dress such as people usually wear who run away—and changing your appearance. Will there be no one to say, that in your old age, when in all probability but a short space of life still remained, you were not ashamed thus ignobly to cling to life, though you broke the highest laws? Perhaps not, unless you offend someone. If you do, you will have to listen, Socrates, to much that will humiliate you. You will spend your life cringing like a slave to everyone, and what will that life be? A prolonged banquet in Thessaly, as if you had travelled

to Thessaly for a dinner? And all your sayings about justice and the other virtues, what, we would like to know, will have become of them? But perhaps it is for your children's sake that you wish to live: you wish to bring them up and educate them? What will you do? Will you take them to Thessaly and bring them up and educate them there, and make foreigners of them, that they may have that additional advantage in life? If you do not, and they are brought up here, will they be better brought up and educated for your being alive, if you are not with them? Your friends will take care of them. But will they take care of them if you undertake a journey to Thessaly, and not take care of them if you undertake a journey to the other world? You ought at least to think they will, if the men who call themselves your friends are worth anything.

16. "But, Socrates, take the advice of us who have reared you, and do not put children, or life, or any other thing before what is right, that when you come to the other world you may be able to plead all this in your defence before those who are rulers there. For it does not appear that your life here or the life of any of your friends is any better or juster or holier if you do this, nor will it be better for you when you come thither. Now if you depart hence, you will depart wronged, not by us the laws, but by men. But if you escape thus shamefully, having repaid wrong with wrong, and evil with evil, having broken the covenants and agreements you made with us, and injured those whom least of all you should have injured, yourself, your friends, your country and us, we shall be wrath with you while you live, and our brethren there, the laws of the other world, will receive you with no favour, for they well know that as far as in you lay you attempted to destroy us. Nay, do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but rather take our advice."

17. This, my dear friend Crito, you may be sure, is what I seem to hear, as those who take part in Corybantic revels imagine that they hear the flutes, and the sound of these words rings in my ears and prevents me hearing the others. Be sure that, as far as I can see at present, if

you speak against them, you will speak in vain. Yet, if you think you can gain anything by speaking, speak.

CR. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Then let it alone, Crito, and let us take this way, since this is the way in which we are divinely led.

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